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Criminal Justice Federalism and National Sex
Offender Policy
Wayne A. Logan*
I. INTRODUCTION
“[A]ll crime,” Justice Potter Stewart once observed, “is a national problem.”1
To the extent this assessment is accurate, it poses special difficulty for a federalist
system such as ours, which reposes main police power authority in the states, not
the national government, and has traditionally favored a decentralized approach to
governance. In recent decades, however, nationalism has largely trumped
federalism concerns, as Congress and the President have federalized a broad range
of criminal misconduct previously the exclusive province of states. The effort, as
students of the field are well aware, has inspired extensive critical commentary2
and two recent Supreme Court decisions overturning federal laws.3
The proliferation of federal criminal laws, however, is only part of the
federalization story; indeed, in practical terms, only a small part. Because the U.S.
can prosecute and punish only a small fraction of the nation’s criminal offenders,
recent federalization efforts have had largely symbolic importance.4 Moreover,
while the unfairness to defendants disadvantaged when their cases “go federal” is
*

Gary and Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Florida
State University College of Law. Thanks to Rachel Barkow, Susan Frederick, Brian Galle, Dan
Markel, Mark Seidenfeld, Bill Van Alstyne, and Ron Wright for comments and suggestions; to
Christopher Ewbank, J.D. 2009, for research help; and to Mary McCormick, for library support.
Also, with regard to the article’s title, a hat tip is in order to predecessor efforts in similar subject
areas, see, for example, Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995); Peter Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997).
1
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 157 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2
For a representative sampling see, for example, Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism,
Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 789 (1996); John S. Baker, Jr., State
Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 673 (1999); Kathleen
Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135
(1995).
3
See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (invalidating a federal law
allowing civil damages for victims of gender-motivated violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 551 (1995) (invalidating a federal law criminalizing the possession or use of a firearm in or near
a school).
4
See Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1555-56 n.71
(2002); William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 844
(2006).
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not to be minimized,5 such impact is limited to individual cases actually channeled
into the federal system.
This Article focuses on a species of federalization of a much broader kind: the
nationwide imposition by the federal government of a criminal justice policy
relating to sex offender registration and community notification. State registration
and notification laws, now in effect nationwide and affecting the daily lives of over
600,000 individuals, and having major resource-related impact on the states, are
the direct result of federal initiative and preference. The federal government has
achieved its goal not by imposing its will straightforwardly on states via the
Commerce Clause, which has provoked such consternation in federalization
debates, but rather more subtly through its conditional Spending Power authority.
The strategic use of honey, not vinegar, has proved a marked success and been met
with silence from the courts, serving to “fasten on the States federal notions of
criminal justice” in a massive way.6
The story of how the federal government achieved this success, and the
consequences it has had, will be examined in the following pages.7 The Article
first provides an overview of the increasing federal involvement in criminal justice
matters over time, then surveys federal efforts since 1994 to enact registration and
community notification laws in particular, culminating with enactment of the
Adam Walsh Act in 2006. Passed by voice votes in both the House and Senate,
and quickly signed by the president, the Walsh Act marks a zenith in federal
intrusiveness, containing an unprecedented array of exacting registration and
notification requirements for states to adopt. The law seeks to create a uniform
national regime and was motivated by congressional concern over the perceived
“patchwork” of “weak” state laws containing “loopholes” permitting individuals to
evade registration and notification. These suppositions, however, do not withstand
empirical scrutiny, and, even more fundamentally, are themselves predicated on an
as yet empirically unsubstantiated faith in the efficacy and effects of registration
and notification. Despite this uncertainty, the U.S. has forged ahead, unreservedly
imposing a comprehensive national regime.
The Walsh Act and predecessor federal laws dating back to 1994 have had a
major impact on states (and their residents) and serious implications for
constitutional federalism.
Part III examines the significant federalism
consequences of the extended federal campaign to impose upon states national
registration and notification policy, and how and why the effort has failed to
5

See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L.
REV. 643 (1997).
6
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7
For a fuller treatment of registration and community notification laws, which originated in
municipal provisions enacted in the early 1930s to monitor emigrant “gangsters,” see WAYNE A.
LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN
AMERICA (Stanford Univ. Press) (forthcoming 2009).
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prompt resistance. Doctrinal concerns over federalism, persuasive as they may be,
however, fail to resolve the instrumental question of the relative utility of the
federal government in the policy formation process. As a result, Part IV considers
the suitability of Congress as a central planner of criminal justice policy, and
presuming the continued determination of the U.S. to play a central role, the nature
and form it should take.
II. FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT
A. Overview
By constitutional design and tradition, the mission of the federal government
in regulating the well-being and safety of its citizenry is highly circumscribed. The
U.S. is bestowed with the “few and defined” areas of authority prescribed in the
Constitution8 and the Tenth Amendment “reserve[s]” the balance of such authority
to states.9 Included in this state reservoir is the police power, an expansive
authority James Madison regarded as extending “to all objects which, in the
ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people . . . .”10
For much of the nation’s history, this demarcation prevailed, with the federal
government exercising restraint relative to its police power authority and the states
defending their prerogative. This changed, however, in the decades following the
Civil War with what Lawrence Friedman has termed the “culture of mobility,”
fostered by the increasing availability of automobiles and railroads, which made
state boundaries “increasingly porous” and conducive to inter-state criminal
misconduct.11 Believing the states ill-equipped to address this shift, Congress
8

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); see also Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 203 (1824) (noting “that immense mass of legislation” that states had “not
surrendered to the general government”). The Constitution grants the federal government explicit
authority only relative to counterfeiting, piracy, military crimes, crimes against the law of nations,
and treason. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 8.
9
See U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (“Under our federal system,
the ‘States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.’”); Screws v.
United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (“Our national government is one of delegated powers alone.
Under our federal system the administration of criminal justice rests with the States except as
Congress, acting within the scope of those delegated powers, has created offenses against the United
States.”).
10
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 260–61 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also
New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650, 661 (1885) (recognizing that “there is a
power, sometimes called the police power,…upon the proper exercise of which . . . may depend the
public health, the public morals, or the public safety. . . ”).
11
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 209, 263 (1993).
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expanded the reach of federal criminal law jurisdiction beyond that specifically
enumerated in the Constitution. Although initially focusing on the need to control
monopolies, lotteries, and the interstate transport of diseased animals, federal
jurisdiction soon expanded to the interstate transport of females for immoral
purposes (Mann Act, 1910), narcotics (Harrison Act, 1914), kidnapping
(Lindbergh Kidnapping Act, 1932), transporting stolen vehicles across state lines
(Dyer Act, 1919), and racketeering (Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, 1934).12 Most
significant, in 1919, as a result of adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment and the
Volstead Act,13 the federal government outlawed the manufacture, sale or transport
of alcohol.
By and large, however, for much of the first half of the twentieth century
criminal justice remained a state and local concern, and the federal impact on
criminal justice matters remained limited and episodic.14 Indeed, while President
Herbert Hoover is generally credited with first characterizing crime as a national
political issue in his 1929 inaugural address,15 Hoover himself—consistent with
tradition—conceived of the federal crime control role as being highly
circumscribed. While urging a “war” on “gangsters,” for instance, Hoover insisted
that the federal government lacked authority to intervene and that the states
themselves step up enforcement of their own laws.16
12
Technically, the Mail Fraud Statute, enacted in 1872, constituted the first U.S. incursion on
states’ criminal jurisdiction, yet it was predicated on the enumerated power of Congress to establish
post offices. See Brickey, supra note 2, at 1142.
13
See generally RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE
REFORM, LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880–1920, at chs. 6–7 (1995) (chronicling the
constitutional debate over Prohibition).
14
This was not to say that federal intrusion was without impact on the federal criminal justice
system. In 1932, for instance, the number of federal criminal cases peaked as a result of Prohibitionera alcohol cases, increasing by more than two and one-half times the volume of federal cases before
Prohibition. See Edward Rubin, A Statistical Study of Federal Criminal Prosecutions, 1 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 494, 497 tbl.1 (1934).
15
FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 273. Hoover followed up by proposing establishment of a
federal commission to study the national implications of crime, which in 1931 resulted in the
publication of a fourteen-volume report under the auspices of the Wickersham Commission. Id. at
273–74. For more on the seminal role of Hoover in nationalizing concern over crime see JAMES D.
CALDER, THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICY: HERBERT HOOVER’S
INITIATIVES (1993).
16
President Demands War on Gangsters; Puts Duty on States: Calls for ’Awakening to
Failure of Some Local Governments to Protect Their Citizens,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1930, at 1. The
same sentiment of federal restraint was voiced by his Attorney General, William DeWitt Mitchell,
who emphasized that
[d]ealing with organized crime . . . is largely a local problem . . . . [T]he fact that these
criminal gangs incidentally violate some federal statute does not place the primary duty
and responsibility of punishing them upon the Federal Government, and until state police
and magistrates, stimulated by public opinion, take hold of this problem, it will not be
solved.
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Even the hugely popular Lindbergh Kidnapping Act, enacted in the wake of
the abduction and murder of aviator Charles Lindbergh’s child, a crime one
newspaper called “a challenge to the whole order of the nation,”17 was resisted out
of concern that the federal government was intruding on state prerogative. As
Representative Earl Michener (R-MI) remarked on the House floor, the tragedy
“must not become a precedent for more legislation giving the Federal Government
concurrent authority with the States in enforcing police regulations and laws
dealing with matters in which the States are primarily interested, and which can be
properly dealt with by State action.”18 Similarly, J. Edgar Hoover, who assumed
leadership of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1924, repeatedly rebuffed
congressional efforts to expand federal criminal law authority, echoing the longheld aversion for a “national police force.”19
In the wake of the 1964 presidential campaign, in which Republican
challenger Barry Goldwater’s focus on “violence in the streets” propelled criminal
justice to national attention, federal reluctance to law-make on criminal justice
matters receded.20
During the Johnson and Nixon administrations, amid
unprecedented high rates of violent crime,21 Congress enacted a series of omnibus
bills that vastly expanded the scope of federal criminal law, targeting firearms and
narcotics in particular.22

HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND,
AND THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE 478 (1937).
17

FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS

IN THE

HISTORY

OF JUSTICE

RICHARD GID POWERS, SECRECY AND POWER: THE LIFE OF J. EDGAR HOOVER 175 (1987);
see also Horace L. Bomar, Jr., The Lindbergh Law, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 435, 436 (1934)
(“Public sentiment having been aroused by this atrocious deed, there was an instant demand that
Congress ‘do something’ about it.”).
18
See 75 CONG. REC. H13,283 (June 17, 1932) (statement of Rep. Michener). Hoover also
opposed using the case as a basis for extending federal criminal justice authority. CALDER, supra
note 15, at 201.
19
SANFORD J. UNGAR, FBI 79 (1976); see also Phillip B. Heyman & Mark H. Moore, The
Federal Role in Dealing with Violent Street Crime: Principles, Questions, and Cautions, 543
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLS. & SOC. SCI. 103, 108 (1996) (noting historic anxiety of national police
force); TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 27 (1998) (“Historically, centralization of criminal law
enforcement power in the federal government has been perceived as creating potentially dangerous
consequences and has therefore been avoided.”).
20
On this national political shift more generally see TED GEST, CRIME AND POLITICS: BIG
GOVERNMENT’S ERRATIC CAMPAIGN FOR LAW & ORDER (2001); NANCY E. MARION, A HISTORY OF
FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL INITIATIVES, 1960–1993 (1994).
21
See Corrina B. Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s
Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1417–18 (2004).
22
See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
84 Stat. 1236 (1970); Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984); AntiDrug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
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In addition to legislation, the federal government came to see a significantly
increased role for itself in the administration of criminal justice.23 The President’s
Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Administration, which in
1967 released its landmark study, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society,
figured centrally in this evolution. The Commission offered several justifications
for an enhanced federal role. First, the trans-boundary nature of crime and the
negative externalities thought associated with the uneven enforcement capacity of
states necessitated federal involvement:
[C]rime is a national, as well as a State and local, phenomenon; it often
does not respect geographical boundaries. The FBI has demonstrated the
high mobility of many criminals. Failure of the criminal justice
institutions in one State may endanger the citizens of others….As
President Johnson stated in his 1966 Crime Message to Congress:
“Crime does not observe neat, jurisdictional lines between city, State,
and Federal Governments . . . . To improve in one part of the country we
must improve in all parts.”24
Moreover, individual states, the Commission noted, lacked the wherewithal to
pursue the “sweeping and costly changes” necessary to secure a significant
nationwide reduction in crime.25 The superior resources of the federal government
were needed to foster the research and experimental efforts prerequisite to this
undertaking.
The programmatic initiative the Commission urged, by its own admission “a
large one,”26 was to be undertaken with due sensitivity for the states’ preeminent
role relative to criminal justice. Rather than dictating policy, federal involvement
would entail “support and collaboration”27 intended to “lead and coordinate change
23
In his first message to Congress, President Johnson asserted that the “Federal Government
will henceforth take a more meaningful role in meeting the whole spectrum of problems posed by
crime,” and offered that crime control “is an area in which the solution depends on cooperation from
the officials of all the fifty states, and also the President, Attorney General, and the FBI.” Johnson, as
Nancy Marion notes, described “a new and previously untested cooperative role in crime control
between the state and federal governments.” MARION, supra note 20, at 60.
24
PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 284 (1967).
25
Id.
26
Id.; see also id. at 283 (“[T]he Federal Government can make a dramatic new contribution
to the national effort against crime by greatly expanding its support of the agencies of justice in the
States and in the cities.”).
27
See id. at 285 (“In proposing a major Federal program against crime, the Commission is
mindful of the special importance of avoiding any invasion of State and local responsibility for law
enforcement and criminal justice, and its recommendation is based on its judgment that Federal
support and collaboration of the sort outlined below are consistent with scrupulous respect for—and
indeed strengthening of—that responsibility.”).
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through providing financial and technical assistance and support of research.”28
Under the auspices of the Law Enforcement and Assistance Administration
(LEAA), created as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,29 over time the federal government provided state and local governments $8
billion in funds.30 Consistent with ascendant enthusiasm for New Federalism,
which emphasized the essential role of states in combating the nation’s social ills,31
and ongoing congressional concern over federal displacement of state crime
control authority more generally,32 money was disbursed in the form of direct
block grants,33 with the states identifying funding priorities and devising initiatives
to handle them.34 The LEAA, as summarized by Malcolm Feeley and Austin Sarat
in their book on the era, had three main functions: (1) oversee the distribution and
expenditure of funds to states; (2) sponsor research and demonstration projects;
and (3) provide technical assistance to the states.35 Put more bluntly, in the words
of Senator Roman Hruska (R-NE), a chief proponent of the bill creating the
agency, the LEAA was a “check writing machine.”36

28
Id. at 301 (“Control of crime and improvement of criminal justice are basically State and
local concerns . . . . The role of the Federal Government must be to lead and coordinate change
through providing financial and technical assistance and support of research.”).
29
See generally Robert F. Diegelman, Federal Financial Assistance for Crime Control:
Lessons of the LEAA Experience, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 994 (1982).
30
DOUGLAS MCDONALD & PETER FINN, ABT ASSOCS. INC., CRIME AND JUSTICE TRENDS IN THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE PAST THREE DECADES 19 (2000).
31
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY
AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION 42–43 (1980) (“It is the states, the New
Federalism suggests, which are both close enough to the citizens to understand their problems yet
large enough to be able to effectively deal with them. In contrast, Washington is too remote and local
governments too small.”).
32
See Diegelman, supra note 29, at 997 (noting with respect to the origins of the LEAA; “any
suggested federal role had to avoid even the slightest appearance that local authority for crime control
was being usurped by the federal government.”); Howard E. Peskoe, The 1968 Safe Streets Act:
Congressional Response to the Growing Crime Problem, 5 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 69, 88–90,
110 (1973) (quoting extensive House and Senate debates expressing concern over federal incursion).
33
Initially, the Johnson Administration proposed grants-in-aid, to be administered by the U.S.
Attorney General, who would wield significant discretionary power over the programs to be funded.
FEELEY & SARAT, supra note 31, at 41–42. Republican resistance soon arose over the method, in part
due to law enforcement officials expressing alarm over the prospect of Johnson’s Attorney General (a
liberal, Ramsey Clark) dictating local policies. Id. The end result of substituting block grants for
grants-in-aid was one of making states the dominant player in a partnership role with the federal
government. Id. at 48–49; see also Peskoe, supra note 32, at 88–89.
34
See Diegelman, supra note 29, at 998 (“[t]he states were to select both the recipients and
the uses of these grants. The states, not the Congress or the federal government, would make choices,
set priorities, and allocate funds.”).
35
FEELEY & SARAT, supra note 31, at 49.
36
Id. at 48.
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After sustained criticism over its inefficiency, mismanagement, and failure to
achieve tangible crime-reduction results, the LEAA was phased out upon
recommendation of President Carter in 1980.37 The Reagan Administration, while
publicly endorsing state criminal justice supremacy, considered federal assistance
in the form of grants and contracts an inappropriate use of federal funds.38 As a
result, federal involvement in the 1980s assumed a more passive form, with a
cluster of agencies such as the National Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice
Statistics, and the Bureau of Justice Assistance (all created in 1979) providing
federal technical support and expertise.39 Yet, the political salience of crime
control was no more lost on President Reagan than any of his recent White House
predecessors. To Reagan, as Daniel Richman has noted, the demise of the LEAA
and its largesse “had more to do with fiscal policy than federalism concerns.”40
Indeed, the Reagan Administration’s tepid federalism was evidenced in its
combined efforts with Congress in the 1980s to dramatically expand federal laws
relating to narcotics and firearms.41 Meanwhile, Congress, acutely aware of
several high-profile crimes in states, expanded federal criminal jurisdiction in other
areas. Among the most notable instances was the 1992 enactment of a federal anticarjacking statute, passed after a widely reported case of a Maryland woman who
was dragged to death while attempting to rescue her daughter from her stolen car.42
Even though state authorities successfully prosecuted the perpetrators under
Maryland statutory law, and life sentences were imposed, Congress fixated on the
lack of U.S. jurisdiction, and quickly passed a new provision;43 two years later, the
law was amended to make fatal carjackings death penalty-eligible.44
Despite these developments, during the 1980s and early 1990s Congress
continued to fund state anti-crime programs by means of grants. For instance, the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, enacted shortly after the demise of the
LEAA, re-opened the federal money spigot to states (albeit at a rate short of that
allocated before).45 Far more significant were two bills passed in 1990 and 1994.
The Crime Control Act of 1990 authorized $900 million in grants for use in state
37

Diegelman, supra note 29, at 996.
John J. DiIulio, Jr. et al., The Federal Role in Crime Control, in CRIME 445, 455 (James Q.
Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 1995).
39
Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME &
JUST. 377, 392 (2006).
40
Id. at 393.
41
Id. at 395–97.
42
GEST, supra note 20, at 69.
43
Id.
44
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322 §
60003(a)(14), 108 Stat. 1796, 1970 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2119(3)(1988)).
45
KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
POLITICS 94–95 (1997).
38
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and local anti-crime efforts, disbursed under a program named after a New York
City police officer killed in the line of duty in 1988: the Edward Byrne Memorial
State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Programs.46 The Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 authorized allocation of $30 billion to
state and local governments to fight crime.47
As the preceding overview suggests, the federal government has over time
increasingly involved itself in the nation’s crime control efforts, with Congress
making liberal use of its Commerce Clause authority to expand its criminal law
jurisdiction and invoking its spending power to figure more centrally in state
criminal justice systems. However, these latter efforts were largely without impact
on substantive law and policy, with the federal government being content to
support the states with grants for equipment, planning, and research support.
In 1994, however, Congress also put its spending authority to more coercive
use to compel changes in state criminal justice policy. It did so with respect to the
community control of convicted sex offenders, a matter unmistakably within the
historic purview of states, by coercing state compliance by means of conditional
funding demands. And whereas in the past, even as recently as the 1980s in its
effort to combat drugs, the federal government at least paid lip service to
federalism concerns,48 in the mid-1990s, with sex offenders, such concern
dissipated, giving way to the creation of an unprecedented national criminal justice
policy.49
46

Anti-Drug Abuse Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6091(a), 102 Stat.
4312, 4329.
47
JEFFEREY A. ROTH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, NCJ 183643,
NATIONAL EVALUATION OF THE COPS PROGRAM-TITLE 1 OF THE 1994 CRIME ACT 41 (2000), available
at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183643.pdf.
48
See, e.g., DRUG ABUSE POLICY OFFICE, WHITE HOUSE, FEDERAL STRATEGY FOR PREVENTION
OF DRUG ABUSE AND DRUG TRAFFICKING 1982, at 3 (1982) (“The 1982 Strategy does not attempt to
dictate from a national level the relative priorities for local responses to drug problems.”). By 1990,
however, one sees a shift in tone, with the White House expecting state adherence to federal policy.
See William J. Bennett, Introduction to OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY WHITE PAPER,
STATE DRUG CONTROL STATUS REPORT 1, 3 (1990) (“Each State can and should be expected to adopt
the laws and policies addressed in this report . . . .”). Federal efforts, however, unlike with sex
offender registration policy, never got beyond the hortatory during this time.
49
On the greater coerciveness of federal policy more generally, see John Kincaid, From
Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 139 (1990); Paul
Posner, The Politics of Coercive Federalism in the Bush Era, 37 PUBLIUS 390, 390–92,400 (2007).
Tim Conlan offers that the relationship has become more “opportunistic” than “coercive,” with
federal actors pursuing “their immediate interests with little regard for the institutional or collective
consequences.” Tim Conlan, From Cooperative to Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on the
Half-Century Anniversary of the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
663, 667 (2006); see also Joseph F. Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption During the George W.
Bush Administration, 37 PUBLIUS 432, 446–47 (2007) (asserting that federal-state relations are more
nuanced than descriptions such as “coercive” or “cooperative” convey). Such a view comports with
that of Daryl Levinson, who asserts that federal actors are motivated more by the immediate desire to
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B. Federal Registration and Community Notification Legislation
It has become commonplace to conceive of the nation’s modern response to
sex offenders as stemming from a “moral panic.” The phrase, if not the concept,
originated with sociologist Stanley Cohen in his 1972 study of the exaggerated
response in England to “Mods and Rockers,” teenage groups who in the mid-1960s
engaged in a series of disturbances in a seaside town. “Societies,” Cohen observed,
“appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic,” resulting in
the “moral barricades [being] manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other
right-thinking people,” and drastic solutions proffered.50 The same phenomenon
was observed by criminologist Edwin Sutherland in 1950, in a study of state laws
originating in the late 1930s that targeted “sexual psychopaths” for indefinite
involuntary civil commitment.51 More recently, adopting a broader historical
framework, Philip Jenkins has identified the nation’s recurrent tendency to fixate
on sexual abuse (especially of children), dating back a century.52
The most recent wave of concern originated in the early 1980s, prompted by
the 1981 disappearance of six-year-old Adam Walsh in Hollywood, Florida, which
led to a massive two-week search that captivated the nation’s attention. After the
boy’s remains were discovered in a canal, his parents, John and Reve Walsh,
initiated a national crusade to “mak[e] the country safe for these little people.”53
Over the next several years, Congress dedicated significant attention to the plight
of missing and kidnapped children, allocating millions of dollars to fund the
campaign, including creation of the National Center for Missing and Exploited
Children, to be headed by John Walsh. By the late 1980s, however, earlier
estimates of the 1.5 million missing children were called into question, with
studies indicating that the vast majority of children were not “literally missing,”
but rather were in the company of family members and abductions and killings by
strangers were uncommon.54
remain in office than any per se desire for empire-building. See Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building
Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 (2005).
50
STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS 1 (3d ed. 2002).
51
Edwin H. Sutherland, The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws, 56 AM. J. SOC. 142, 146–
47 (1950).
52
PHILLIP JENKINS, MORAL PANIC: CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE CHILD MOLESTER IN MODERN
AMERICA (1998). Moral panic, while useful as an analytic framework suggestive of the tenor of the
times, implies that the underlying concern—such as that posed by the Mods and Rockers in Cohen’s
seminal work—is somehow not worthy of concern. Sexual abuse, no matter what its actual extent, is
surely worthy of concern.
53
Sandy Rovner, Hot Line of Hope; After ‘Adam,’ Three Children are Found, WASH. POST,
May 1, 1985, at C1.
54
See DAVID FINKELHOR ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MISSING, ABDUCTED, RUNAWAY, AND
THROWNAWAY CHILDREN IN AMERICA, FIRST REPORT: NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS NATIONAL
INCIDENCE STUDIES vii (1990).
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As a result, focus and concern soon shifted from child abduction and abuse to
sexual victimization. Even though it was never confirmed that Adam Walsh was
sexually abused, his image persisted as a reminder of the possible depredations
faced by children, and soon coalesced with media reports of widespread sexual
abuse in day care centers, including centers in California, North Carolina, and
Minnesota. Meanwhile, other child victimizations captured the nation’s attention
and fueled concern. In May 1989, a seven-year-old boy in Tacoma, Washington,
(whose identity was not revealed) was sexually abused and mutilated by Earl
Shriner, a recidivist sex offender with a long history of convictions. And in
October 1989, eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling was abducted from near his home
in rural Minnesota by a masked male adult brandishing a gun.55 Although no
arrests were ever made, and his remains never found, the tragedy prompted his
mother Patty to create the Jacob Wetterling Foundation, an organization that would
come to have significant national influence on child violence and sexual abuse
policy matters.56
The events in Washington State and Minnesota had major effect, not only
because they garnered significant media attention, but also because they spurred
renewed interest in a long-overlooked social control strategy: requiring that
criminal offenders register with authorities. While the idea of registering exoffenders originated in Europe and elsewhere, registration first took hold in the
United States in the early 1930s, in the Los Angeles area, amid widespread
concern over emigrant “gangsters.” Florida, in 1937, became the first state to
adopt a registration law, but did so sparingly, only requiring registration of persons
convicted of felonies “involving moral turpitude” living in the state’s three most
populous counties. In 1947, California enacted the nation’s first registration law of
state-wide application, targeting convicted sex offenders. By 1989, however, only
a handful of states had laws.57
In response to the assault by Shriner, as well as a series of other widely
reported sexual victimizations of women and children, Washington State enacted
its Community Protection Act of 1990. The expansive law, which not only
contained the state’s first registration provision and permitted the involuntary civil
commitment of sex offenders, for the first time permitted public disclosure of
identifying information on registrants themselves (a process that came to be known
as “community notification”). Minnesota, in response to the Wetterling tragedy,
enacted a registration law (sans community notification) in 1991, becoming the
fifteenth state to require registration.58
55

Wayne A. Logan, Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification
Laws, Practice, and Procedure in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2003).
56
For a history of the organization and its advocacy efforts see Jacob Wetterling Foundation,
http://www.jwf.org (last visited September 5, 2008).
57
See LOGAN, supra note 7, at ch. 2.
58
Logan, supra note 55, at 1293.
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The aforementioned state developments did not escape the attention of
Congress. Indeed, Wetterling’s October 1989 disappearance in Minnesota
prompted the state’s senior U.S. Senator, David Durenberger (R-MN), in May
1991, to push for adoption of the “Crimes Against Children Registration Act.”59
Durenberger told his Senate colleagues:
The reasons for enacting this legislation on the national level are clear:
sexual crimes against children are widespread; the people who commit
these offenses repeat their crimes again and again; and local law
enforcement officials need access to an interstate system of information
to prevent and respond to these horrible crimes against children.60
Despite the uncertainty attending Jacob’s disappearance, Durenberger stressed
that if law enforcement “had been aware of the presence of any convicted sex
offenders in the community, it would have been of invaluable assistance during
those first critical hours of investigation.”61 Durenberger urged congressional
adoption of a registration system like that enacted in Minnesota, which required
persons convicted of a sexual offense against a child to register a home address
with local law enforcement for a period of ten years after release into the
community.62 Representative Jim Ramstad (R-MN) introduced a similar bill in the
House in July.63 However, despite the backing of the Wetterling Foundation and
bi-partisan support in both houses of Congress, registration failed to pass muster in
the Senate after conference.64
Undaunted, Durenberger continued his push for legislation, which soon was
renamed in memory of Jacob Wetterling.65 In November 1993, the campaign was
advanced in the House by Ramstad, who, along with numerous others, emphasized
the need for a registration law in light of the purported high recidivism risk of sex
59
Associated Press, Jacob’s Parents Urge Support for Abuser Bill, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis), May 26, 1991, at B7 (noting and discussing Senate Bill 1170). A year earlier, Senator
Durenberger, with Patty Wetterling and her son Trevor in the public gallery, spoke to his colleagues
of Jacob’s abduction and called for “more study and resources into reducing” child abductions. He
also entered into the record a Department of Justice report and newspaper stories on the issue, as well
as information on the Wetterling Foundation. 136 CONG. REC. S5761 (daily ed. May 7, 1990).
60
137 CONG. REC. S6702, S6703 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (statement of Sen. Durenberger).
61
Id.
62
See id. at S6703.
63
137 CONG. REC. H5339, H5340 (daily ed. July 10, 1991) (introducing H.R. 2862).
64
See 140 CONG. REC. S2825, S2825 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger discussing three years of unsuccessful efforts to enact registration legislation); 139
CONG. REC. S6863, S6863 (statement of Sen. Durenberger discussing failure of the 102nd Congress
to pass registration as part of both Democratic and Republican crime bills).
65
See 137 CONG. REC. S9809, S9822 (daily ed. July 11, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger).
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offenders.66 Again, registration was touted for its capacity to provide law
enforcement with access to information on convicted offenders in the immediate
wake of a child being abducted or harmed.67 According to Representative James
Sensenbrenner (R-WI):
[b]ecause there is not a national registry of people who have been convicted
of a crime against a child and have served their prison time and have been
paroled out, law enforcement really is not able to track down those who
would be the prime suspect as quickly as possible. So that is why the Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children Registration Act is before us today.68
Even though twenty-four states at the time had registration laws, a federal
“stick”69 was needed “to prod all States to enact similar laws and to provide for a
national registration system to handle offenders who move from one State to
another.”70 Federal law would do so by threatening to withhold crime-fighting
funds from states that failed to adopt registration requirements prescribed by
Congress.71
In its original incarnations, starting in 1991, what was to become the Jacob
Wetterling Act treated registrants’ information as “private data,” available only to
law enforcement for investigative purposes and government agencies for
confidential background checks on persons working with children.72 Indeed, while
the bill was being considered, efforts to permit community notification were
rebuffed. A provision authorizing notification and also targeting “sexually violent
predators,” who victimized adults, was inserted late in the process by Senator
66

See 139 CONG. REC. H10,319 H10,321 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Ramstad) (“We know that child sex offenders are repeat offenders. . . . Child sex offenders repeat
their crimes again and again and again to the point of compulsion.”); see also, e.g., id.. at H10,320
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (“The reason this bill is so important is because of the high rate of
recidivism in persons who have committed crimes against children, and it is not just sex crimes
against children but all crimes against children.”); id. at H10,322 (statement of Rep. Grams) (“Studies
have shown that child sex offenders are some of the most notorious repeat offenders. . . . [T]his bill
gives society the right to know where these convicted offenders reside.”).
67
See id. at H10,320 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); id. at H10,321 (statement of Rep.
Ramstad).
68
Id. at H10,320 (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner).
69
Id. (“The stick that is contained in this bill to make sure that those States that have not
established this type of a list is the fact that if 3 years go by and a State does not have such a registry,
their Bureau of Justice assistance grants funds are reduced by 10 percent and allocated to those States
that have done this job.”).
70
Id. at H10,321 (statement of Rep. Ramstad).
71
42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2) (2006); see also 139 CONG. REC. H10,319, H10,320 (daily ed.
Nov. 20, 1993).
72
139 CONG. REC. H10,319, H10,320 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993); 137 CONG. REC. S6702,
S6704 (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
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Slade Gorton (R-WA) and Representative Jennifer Dunn (R-WA), based on
provisions in Washington State’s 1990 law.73 Because House and Senate bills
differed,74 with the House version omitting community notification,75 a conference
committee was convened. Speaking on behalf of notification in summer 1994,
Dunn urged on the House floor:
What is the point of registering and tracking these convicted predators if
we are not going to share that information with the very citizens who are
at risk? How can we justify knowing where a sexual predator has
located, and not notify the women and families in that neighborhood?
The rate of recidivism for these crimes is astronomical. We know that.
And that is why it is incumbent upon us to ensure that community
notification is encouraged. Without the community notification, the
effort is reduced simply to the collection of data.76
Dunn’s non-binding motion urging the conference committee to include a
notification provision prevailed by a 420-13 vote, yet the committee’s report,
likely as a result of concern over its negative effects,77 omitted notification.78
As history would have it, however, the report was released on the same day in
late July 1994 as the media was dominated by reports of the rape and murder of
seven-year-old Megan Kanka in suburban Hamilton Township, New Jersey, by a
recidivist sex offender who lived nearby.79 By then, members of Congress—and
the American public—had been privy to an extended series of grisly child sexual
victimizations and killings by recidivist offenders, including those of Zachary
Snider (Indiana, July 1993) and Polly Klaas (California, October 1993). With
news of the Megan Kanka tragedy, Senator Gorton and Representative Dunn took
to the floor to castigate the conferees for omitting the community notification
provision. Gorton stated:
[T]he conferees just do not get it. [Only providing information to police]
is meaningless. It would not have helped Megan Kanka . . . . It would
not have helped Polly Klaas. . . .

73

Robert T. Nelson, Gorton, Dunn Oppose Crime Bill, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 24, 1994, at A1.
H.R. 324, 103d Cong. (1993), 139 CONG. REC. H10,319 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993).
75
See Nelson, supra note 73.
76
140 CONG. REC. H5612, H5612 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (statement of Rep. Dunn).
77
See id. at (statement of Rep. Nadler raising concern over possible vigilantism and
banishment of registrants).
78
Nelson, supra note 73.
79
Id.
74
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The families in these communities and these innocent victims had a right
to know that dangerous sexual predators were in their midst. My
amendment to the crime bill would have provided exactly that kind of
notification. . . .
I offer this bipartisan bill today in the memory of Megan Kanka, Polly
Klaas, and the thousands of innocent victims of brutal rapists, molesters,
and murderers, that deserve to know when sexually violent predators
were released into their community.80
A week later, Dunn rose to speak in the House “with a deep sense of outrage”:
Seven-year-old Megan Kanka of New Jersey is dead, Mr. Speaker.
Sexual predators were released into her community and they lured that
precious little girl to a grisly death.
Conferees who worked to protect the rights of sexual predators should
understand this: The next little girl killed by a released predator will
haunt them.
Mr. Speaker, it is outrageous that a few conferees have supplanted their
will for the will of the House. It is outrageous that this bill effectively
denies notification to the next Megan Kanka or the next Polly Klaas, or
to your mother or sister or daughter. And it is outrageous that we would
place the rights of criminals over the rights of victims.81
Representative Dick Zimmer (R-NJ) made the absence of notification a key
rallying point and Chris Smith (R-NJ), representing the township in which Megan
Kanka lived, condemned the “arrogance” of the conferees and demanded that
notification be included. Smith stated, “No one in the community knew the killer’s
sordid past, Mr. Speaker. Had Megan’s grieving parents known that their neighbor
was a dangerous person, they would have taken steps to protect their precious
child. Megan’s parents had a right to know.”82
The redoubled effort to include a notification provision proved a success, in
part as a result of lobbying efforts by President Bill Clinton,83 who signed the
80

140 CONG. REC. S10,638 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
140 CONG. REC. H7939-40 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1994) (statement of Rep. Dunn).
82
Id. at H7950 (Aug. 11, 1994) (statement of Rep. Smith). See also Fred Bayles, Murder
Renews Calls for Sex Crime Registry, CHI.-SUN TIMES, Aug. 8, 1994, at 3.
83
See 140 CONG. REC. S11,889 (daily ed. Aug. 16, 1994) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg,
recounting that the President had called him twice urging that a notification provision be included);
Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Approves Stringent Restrictions on Sex Criminals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1,
81
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legislation into law (with Maureen Kanka at his side)84 as part of the massive $30
billion omnibus anti-crime bill on September 13, 1994.85
Intended to compel the states to enact registration laws and ensure adoption of
registration minima,86 the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
Violent Offender Registration Act required states to adopt its provisions if they
wished to avoid losing ten percent of available Byrne Formula Grant criminal
justice funds.87 States had to do so within three years of the law’s enactment,
subject to a two-year extension for states making “good faith efforts,” and any
undistributed funds resulting from a state’s failure to comply were to be reallocated
to compliant states.88
In its final form, the Wetterling Act also affected a broader swath of offenders
than originally envisioned. In initial form, in May 1991, the law targeted only
persons “convicted of a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor.”89 When
1994, at B1 (noting that “[w]hen President Clinton lobbied for the Federal crime bill last summer, he
mentioned Megan and the need for a community-notification provision. That provision is now part of
Federal law.”). See also Katharine Q. Seelye, Search for Votes on Crime Turns Up Only
Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994, at B6 (noting report from Rep. Susan Molinari that
President Clinton had expressed his regret that community notification had been dropped from the
bill and that he would seek to get it reinserted).
Clinton, as part of his “new Democrat” orientation, and anxious over Republican assertions that
his policy of permitting gays to remain in the military amounted to condoning sexual perversion, as
well as public statements that the Department of Justice had softened child pornography laws, quickly
backed the legislation. Soon thereafter, in the wake of major electoral gains by Republicans in the
1994 elections, Clinton, seeking to not be outflanked by a Republican “family values” mantra,
became a staunch supporter of legislation designed to target sex offenders and protect children.
JENKINS, supra note 52, at 198–99.
84
David Bauman, Crime Victim’s Mom: Signing of Crime Bill “Bittersweet,” GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 13, 1994.
85
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101,
108 Stat. 1796, 2038 [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2006)]. The expansive law contained thirty-two
separate titles, ranging from community policing, violence against women, the death penalty,
mandatory minimum sentences for federal criminal offenders, and “truth-in-sentencing” provisions
that provided “incentive grants” to states to ensure that state violent offenders serve at least 85% of
their terms. The varied contents very likely accounted for the relatively close vote margins, 235-195
in the House, and 61-38 in the Senate. As discussed below, subsequent federal bills relating to
registration and community notification passed by voice vote, by unanimous vote, or unanimous
consent.
86
See 139 CONG. REC. H10,319, H10,321 (daily ed. Nov. 20 1993) (statement of Rep.
Ramstad); 139 CONG. REC. S15,295, S25,310 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1993) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
87
42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(2)(A). The 10% figure marked a decrease from that in prior bills. In
its original incarnation, as proposed by Senator Durenberger in 1991, Wetterling mandated that
noncompliant states would be totally barred from Byrne Grant funds, and later, in June 1991,
threatened a 25% reduction. See 137 CONG. REC. S8907, S8914 (daily ed. June 27, 1991); 137 CONG.
REC. S6702, S6703 (daily ed. May 23, 1991) (containing S. 1170).
88
42 U.S.C. § 14071(g)(1).
89
137 CONG. REC. S6702, S6703 (containing S. 1170) (daily ed. May 23, 1991).
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signed into law by the president in September 1994, this requirement remained,90
but the law also targeted persons (1) convicted of “a sexually violent offense”91 or
(2) designated by the sentencing court as a “sexually violent predator.”92 The
registration requirement applied only to persons released from prison or placed on
probation, parole, or supervised release after the Act’s implementation93 and
afforded individuals ten days to register.94
Sexually violent predators were subject to lifetime registration (with possible
judicial relief)95 and had to verify their addresses every ninety days.96 The other
two categories of registrants had to register for ten years97 and annually verify their
home address by returning a non-forwardable form mailed to them by law
enforcement officials within ten days of receipt.98 They were also required to
provide a photograph and fingerprints (if not already on file).99 Information on all
90

Such an offense was defined as:
[A]ny criminal offense in a range of offenses specified by State law which is comparable to or
which exceeds the following range of offenses:
(i) kidnapping of a minor except by a parent;
(ii) false imprisonment of a minor, except by a parent;
(iii) criminal sexual conduct toward a minor;
(iv) solicitation of a minor to engage in sexual conduct;
(v) use of a minor in a sexual performance;
(vi) solicitation of a minor to practice prostitution;
(vii) any conduct that by its nature is a sexual offense against a minor;
….
(ix) an attempt [to commit one of the aforementioned offenses] . . . .
For purposes of this subparagraph conduct which is criminal only because of the age of the victim
shall not be considered a criminal offense if the perpetrator is 18 years of age or younger.
42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(3)(A).
91
Defined to include “any criminal offense . . . [that consists of] aggravated sexual abuse or
sexual abuse” (as defined by federal law) or “an offense that has as its elements engaging in physical
contact with another person with intent to commit aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse” (as
defined by federal law). Id. § 14071(a)(3)(B).
92
Defined as “a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to engage in predatory
sexually violent offenses.” Id. § 14071(a)(3)(C). See also id. § 14071(a)(3)(D)-(E) (providing
definitions for “mental abnormality” and “predatory”).
93
Id. § 14071(b).
94
Id. § 14071(b)(1)(A) (amended 1997).
95
Id. § 14071(b)(6)(B)(iii).
96
Id. § 14071(b)(3)(B).
97
Id. § 14071(b)(6)(A).
98
Id. § 14071(b)(3)(A) (amended 1997).
99
Id. § 14071, (b)(1)(A)(iv) (current version).
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registrants was to be shared with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.100
Individuals who knowingly violated the law were “subject to criminal penalties in
any State” in which the violation occurred.101
Congress, tracking the Washington State provision, elected to make
community notification permissive, not mandatory. Information on registrants
“may” be disclosed to law enforcement and government agencies doing
background checks and law enforcement itself “shall release relevant information
that is necessary to protect the public” regarding a registrant.102
Wetterling further specified that the Attorney General was to issue guidelines
that elaborated on the Act’s provisions,103 and in April 1994 the Attorney General
did so.104 Although not specified by Congress in Wetterling itself, the guidelines
emphasized that the federal requirements constituted a “floor for state registration
systems, not a ceiling.”105 According to the guidelines, “[t]he general objective of
the Act is to protect people from child molesters and violent sex offenders through
registration requirements. It is not intended, and does not have the effect, of
making states less free than they were under prior law to impose registration
requirements for this purpose.”106
The guidelines noted a variety of ways that states could build upon the
baseline requirements contained in Wetterling, including:
●
●
●
●
●
●

100

broaden the scope of offenders made to register (both types of crimes
and jurisdiction—e.g., those convicted in federal or military court);
require address verification at more frequent intervals;
mandate registration for longer periods of time;
make registration retroactive, affecting persons released before the
law’s enactment;
require collection of other registration information (e.g., place of
employment); and
require registration of juvenile offenders (as opposed to juveniles
prosecuted and convicted as adults).107

Id. § 14071 (b)(2)(A).
Id. § 14071(d).
102
Id. § 14071(e).
103
Id. § 14071(a)(1).
104
Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 15,110 (Apr. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Wetterling Guidelines].
105
Id. at 15,112.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 15,112–15,115.
101
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The states enjoyed similar upward latitude with respect to community
notification. Federal law imposed no limits on the “standards and procedures that
states may adopt for determining when public safety necessitates community
notification.”108 With respect to which registrants should be subject to community
notification, states were free to (1) engage in “particularized determinations that
individual offenders are sufficiently dangerous to require community
notification . . .” or (2) make “categorical judgments that protection of the public
necessitates community notification with respect to all offenders with certain
characteristics or in certain offense categories.”109 Finally, the guidelines observed
that Wetterling only permitted, and did not require, community notification. States
electing to employ notification could authorize agencies “to release information as
necessary” or allow the public to access registrants’ information.110
Wetterling was not the federal government’s last word on registration—far
from it. Since 1994, Congress has repeatedly imposed new registration
requirements on the states, pressuring compliance via its Spending Clause
authority by threatening loss of ten percent of federal funds allocated under the
Byrne Grant Program.
This inclination manifested itself again in May 1996, less than a year after
Wetterling became law, when Representative Zimmer introduced H.R. 2137,
mandating that states utilize community notification.111 Concerned that states were
“reluctant” to release information on registrants,112 and that a lack of community
notification in some twenty states might leave communities vulnerable and
encourage sex offenders to migrate in search of anonymity,113 Zimmer’s proposal,
despite its obvious conflict with the regnant state-empowerment ideals of the
Republicans’ “Contract with America,”114 won unanimous support from both
Houses of Congress.115 In May 1996, President Clinton signed the federal
108

Id. at 15,116.
Id.
110
Id. at 15116–17.
111
See 142 CONG. REC. H4451, H4452-53 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Zimmer). See also id. at H4452, Committee on the Judiciary, Accompanying H.R. 2137, at *2 (“It
has been brought to the attention of the . . . Committee . . . that notwithstanding the clear intent of
Congress that relevant information about these offenders be released to the public . . . some law
enforcement agencies are still reluctant to do so.”).
112
See id. at H4451 (statement of Rep. McCollum).
113
Minor & Miscellaneous Bills (Part 2) Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 98–102 (1996) (statement of Rep. Dick Zimmer, H.R. on the
Judiciary).
114
See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP. DICK
ARMEY AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellas eds.,
1994).
115
In the House, the vote in favor of the amendment was 418-0 and the Senate passed the bill
by unanimous consent. For fuller discussion of the votes, including vote changes by individual
109
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Megan’s Law. With Richard and Maureen Kanka, Patty Wetterling, and the father
of Polly Klaas at his side at the White House Rose Garden signing ceremony,
Clinton remarked:
From now on, every State in the country will be required by law to tell a
community when a dangerous sexual predator enters its midst. We
respect people’s rights, but today America proclaims there is no greater
right than a parent’s right to raise a child in safety and love. Today
America warns: If you dare prey on our children, the law will follow you
wherever you go, State to State, town to town. Today America circles
the wagon[s] around our children.116
Later, in his weekly radio address to the nation, President Clinton invoked the
memory of Megan Kanka and emphasized the informational empowerment
premise of the new federal mandate:
Nothing is more important than keeping our children safe. . . . That’s
why in the crime bill we required every state in the country to compile a
registry of sex offenders, and gave states the power to notify
communities about child sex offenders and violent sex offenders that
move into their neighborhoods.
But that wasn’t enough, and last month I signed Megan’s [L]aw. That
insists that states tell a community whenever a dangerous sexual predator
enters its midst. Too many children and their families have paid a
terrible price because parents didn’t know about the dangers hidden in
their own neighborhood. Megan’s [L]aw, named after a seven-year-old
girl taken so wrongly at the beginning of her life, will help to prevent
more of these terrible crimes.117
And in a later address, he continued:
We are following through on our commitment to keep track of these
criminals—not just in a single state, but wherever they go, wherever they
move, so that parents and police have the warning they need to protect

House members accounting for the final outcome, see LORD WINDLESHAM, POLITICS, PUNISHMENT,
179–80 (1998).
116
Remarks on Signing Megan’s Law and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 763–64
(1996).
117
President Clinton’s Weekly Radio Address (CNN radio broadcast June 22, 1996), transcript
available at http://edition.cnn.com/US/9606/22/clinton.radio/transcript.html.
AND POPULISM
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our children. . . . Deadly criminals don’t stay within state lines, so
neither should law enforcement’s tools to stop them.118
With Megan’s Law, the federal government did not now merely permit
community notification. States were instructed that they “shall release relevant
information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person
required to register.”119 Again, guidelines issued by the Attorney General
elaborated on the new law,120 this time specifying the ways in which the states
would not satisfy federal community notification expectations. States wishing to
receive Byrne Grant funds could not merely release registrants’ information to law
enforcement, government agencies, victims, or potential employers. Nor could
they comply by affording “purely permissive or discretionary authority” to
officials to conduct notification. Rather, notification in some form and to some
extent was required.121
The guidelines emphasized, however, that states retained discretion over
which registrants in particular would be subject to community notification and how
information on registrants would be disseminated.122 Citing state experiences, the
guidelines identified several ways the new community notification requirement
could be satisfied. States could:
(1) conduct risk assessments of all registrants, and release information in
accord with assessed risk levels;
(2) release information on registrants convicted of certain offenses, for
instance persons convicted of child molestation, or recidivist sexual
offenders; or
(3) make registrant information available to the public for inspection
upon their request, and make judgments about which individual
registrants or classes of registrants are covered and what
information will be disclosed concerning these registrants.123

118

Brian McGrory, Clinton Sets Tracking of Sex Offenders, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1996, at
A1 (quoting President Clinton’s Weekly Radio Address (Aug. 24. 1996)).
119
42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (2006) (emphasis added).
120
Final Guidelines for Megan’s Law and the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and
Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 39,009 (July 21, 1997) [hereinafter
Megan’s Law Guidelines].
121
Id. at 39,019.
122
See id. (“States do . . . retain discretion to make judgments concerning the circumstances in
which, and the extent to which, the disclosure of registration information to the public is necessary
for public safety purposes and to specify standards and procedures for making these
determinations.”).
123
Id.

72

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 6:51

The guidelines did not address how registrants’ information was to be
disseminated, such as by means of mailings, personal visits, or community
meetings. Nor did they specify what qualified as the “relevant information” that
was to be disclosed.
Only a few months later, in October 1996, federal requirements were again
expanded, with the Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act
of 1996,124 named after a Houston real estate agent who was sexually assaulted by
a twice-convicted felon who had moved to Texas after committing his crimes outof-state.125 Lychner retained the baseline ten-year registration requirement but
expanded the lifetime registration requirement beyond designated sexually violent
predators to also include offenders (1) twice convicted of committing a criminal
offense against a minor, (2) twice convicted of committing a sexually violent
offense, and (3) convicted of aggravated sexual abuse.126
Lychner also greatly enhanced federal involvement in the monitoring of
registrants, creating a national database at the FBI consisting of registrant
information provided by states, designed to allow the FBI to track the whereabouts
of registrants.127 While Wetterling had required states to forward registrant
information to the FBI, Lychner required registrants themselves to submit
information to the FBI—if they lived in a state without a “minimally sufficient
registration program.”128 The FBI, in turn, was required to verify these registrants’
identifying information and was authorized to release information as “necessary to
protect the public.”129 If individuals failed to comply, they faced a fine of up to
$100,000 and a year in prison.130
Subsequent to Lychner, the U.S. enacted numerous other provisions,
including:
●

In 1997, the Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act, which required states
to implement methods to identify individuals as sexually violent
offenders; required registrants who changed state residences to
register under the new state’s laws; required registrants to register in
states where they worked or attended school if those states differed

124
Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104236, 110 Stat. 3093 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (2006)).
125
Lychner and her two daughters were killed in the explosion of TWA Flight 800 off the
coast of Long Island in 1996. Later that year Congress passed the Lychner Act in her memory.
126
42 U.S.C. § 14072(d)(2). “Aggravated sexual abuse” includes among other things sexual
acts accompanied by force or threats, as well as any sexual act with a minor under the age of twelve.
18 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
127
42 U.S.C. § 14072(b).
128
Id. at § 14072(c).
129
Id. at § 14072(e)-(f).
130
Id. at § 14072(i)(1)(a)-(b) (amended 1998).
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from their state residence; directed states to participate in the
national sex offender registry; required state procedures to ensure
that registrants’ addresses were verified at least annually; and
extended registration requirements to eligible offenders convicted in
federal or military courts.131
● In 1998, the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act, which
modified how states were to determine whether a registrant
qualified as a sexually violent predator.132 Also in 1998, the Fiscal
Year 1999 Omnibus Appropriations Bill specified that failure of
state registration violations warranted a maximum term of one year
imprisonment for a first offense and a maximum ten years for a
subsequent offense.133
● In 2000, the Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act, which required nonresident registrants to inform state authorities when they were
employed, carried on a vocation, or enrolled as a student at colleges
and universities, and apprise authorities of any change in status.134
Registrants’ information must be made available to the “campus
community,” a requirement institutions have satisfied by making the
information available upon request or by maintaining a campusspecific registry.135
● In 2003, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the
Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act, which required
that each state create and maintain an Internet web site making
registrants’ information available to the public and directed the
Department of Justice to maintain an Internet site with links to each
state web site.136
● In 2005, implemented the National Sex Offender Public Registry (later
renamed the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Registry), to
be maintained by the Department of Justice, which assembles on

131

Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration
Improvements Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 115, 111 Stat. 2440, 2461-67.
132
Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998 Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 102(2),
112 Stat. 2974, 2975-76.
133
Pub. L. No. 105-277, Tit. 13, § 123, 112 Stat. 2681-72-73 (1998).
134
Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1601(b)-(c), 114 Stat. 1537,
1538 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)(1) and 42 U.S.C. § 14071(j)).
135
See Richard Tewksbury & Matthew Lees, Sex Offenders on Campus: University-Based Sex
Offender Registries and the Collateral Consequences of Registration, 70 FED. PROBATION 50, 51
(2007).
136
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
[PROTECT] Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
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one web site links to state registries and creates a searchable
national registry.137
Most recently, in 2006, by voice votes in both the House and Senate, and with
more than three dozen co-sponsors, Congress adopted its most extensive array of
state directives to date. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006
(AWA)138 was signed by President Bush on July 27, 2006, twenty-five years to the
day after six-year-old Adam Walsh disappeared from a Florida mall. While named
after Adam Walsh, and enacted in recognition of the advocacy work of his parents
John and Reve Walsh (the former later became host of the popular television show
“America’s Most Wanted”),139 the AWA established the Jacob Wetterling, Megan
Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner Sex Offender Registration and Notification
Program,140 and named several of its constituent programs after other victims.141
In addition to creating the first federal involuntary civil commitment law (targeting
“sexually dangerous persons”),142 and creating a national child abuse and neglect
registry,143 the AWA substantially overhauled federal registration and community
notification policy, in the process expressly repealing the Wetterling Act, Megan’s
Law, and the Lychner Act.144 The AWA seeks, in the words of Congress, to
establish a “comprehensive national system for the registration [of sex offenders
and offenders against children].”145 Jurisdictions wishing to receive their total
allocation of funds under the Byrne Act program must “maintain a jurisdictionwide sex offender registry conforming to the requirements” of the AWA’s
provisions.146

137
S. 792, 109th Cong. (2005) (directing the Attorney General to make available a national
registry via the Internet), available at http://www.nsopr.gov.
138
Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
139
Id. at § 2, 120 Stat. 587 (2006).
140
42 U.S.C. § 16902 (2006). The law was enacted “in response to the vicious attacks by
violent predators” against seventeen specified victims (including three adult females), exclusive of
Adam Walsh. See 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
141
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 16920 (2006) (establishing “Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public
Website”); 42 U.S.C. § 16988 (2006) (establishing “Jessica Lunsford Address Verification Grant
Program”); 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(A) (2006) (“Amie Zyla Expansion of Sex Offense Definition”).
142
See 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2006).
143
See 42 U.S.C. § 16990 (2006). The registry is limited to “substantiated cases” of abuse and
neglect and access to it is to be limited to government agencies (and their agents) in the child
protective service field. Id. § 16990(e).
144
Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 129, 120 Stat. 587, 6000-601(2006).
145
42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
146
42 U.S.C. § 16912(a) (2006).
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Like Megan’s Law in 1996,147 the AWA was motivated by concern over the
variations in state registration and notification laws and their perceived laxness.
Yet in 2006 this concern was much more palpable, with legislators repeatedly
condemning state “loopholes,” “disparities,” and “deficiencies,” which purportedly
allowed an excess of 100,000 registrants to become “lost.”148 As Senator Orrin
Hatch (R-UT), a co-sponsor of the bill explained, the AWA created “uniform
standards for the registration of sex offenders,” emphasizing that it was
critical to sew together the patch-work quilt of 50 different State attempts
to identify and keep track of sex offenders. . . . Laws regarding
registration for sex offenders have not been consistent from State to
State[;] now all states will lock arms and present a unified front in the
battle to protect children. Web sites that have been weak in the past, due
to weak laws and haphazard updating and based on inaccurate
information, will now be accurate, updated, and useful for finding sex
offenders.149
Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), another co-sponsor, urged that the AWA was
needed to remedy perceived deficiencies in prior congressional efforts: “[t]his is
about uniting 50 States in common purpose and in league with one another to
prevent these lowlifes from slipping through the cracks. So we recognize that what
we have done in the past did not do all we wanted to do.”150 State registration and
notification laws, according to Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), had “proved to be
relatively ineffective, which requires the Federal Government to act on the national

147

See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text; see also 142 CONG. REC. H4452, H4453
(daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Zimmer) (urging adoption of the federal Megan’s Law “so
that all 50 states [would] be held to a common standard of community notification.”). In the final
Megan’s Law Guidelines, issued in mid-July 1997, the Attorney General stressed that federal law
“contemplates the creation of a gap-free network of state registration programs, under which
offenders who are registered in one state cannot escape registration requirements merely by moving
to another state.” Megan’s Law Final Guidelines, supra note 120, at 39011.
148
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 218, pt. 1, at 23–24 (2005); 151 CONG. REC. H7889 (daily ed. Sept.
14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Green); 152 CONG. REC. S8018 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of
Sen. Allen); 152 CONG. REC. S8022 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. DeWine); 152 CONG.
REC. S8030 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Frist); House Bills on Sexual Crimes Against
Children: Hearing on H.R. 764, H.R. 95, H.R. 1355, H.R. 1505, H.R. 2423, H.R. 244, H.R. 2796, and
H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (statement of Rep. Poe); id. at 13 (statement of Rep. BrownWaite); 151 CONG. REC. H7893 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2005) (statements of Rep. Royce and Rep.
Graves); 151 CONG. REC. H7920 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); 152
CONG. REC. S8020 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Cantwell).
149
152 CONG. REC. S8012, 8013 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
150
Id. at S8013 (statement of Sen. Biden).
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level.”151 Representative Ginny Brown-Waite (R-FL) stated that it was “important
that we send a loud and clear message that Congress is serious about protecting
America’s children from predators, those same predators who would harm our
children, our grandchildren, and our neighbor’s children . . . . Congress has a duty
to act and protect our children nationwide, because these predators move from
state to state.”152 Representative Mark Udall (D-CO), echoing another commonly
voiced sentiment, condemned the current “patch-work quilt of [fifty] different state
systems for identifying and tracking sex offenders.”153
Ernie Allen, President and CEO of the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children, testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, emphasized
what he saw as the difficulties created by the lack of “consistency” and
“uniformity” in state laws that permitted registrants to “forum-shop” among states.
“The public,” Allen urged, “has a right to know about all registered sex offenders
living in our communities. The amount of protection a child is given shouldn’t
depend on the state in which that child lives. There is clearly a need for more
uniformity among state programs of community notification of sex offenders.” A
“seamless, coordinated, uniform system that works” was needed and states should
disclose information on all registrants, not merely those deemed most likely to
recidivate.154
Roughly two years in the making, the AWA mandates major changes in state
registration and community notification laws. The first way it does so is by
broadening the scope of offenses warranting registration.155 Whereas Wetterling
required registration for persons convicted of a sexually violent offense or a crime
against a minor, the AWA requires that all persons convicted of a “sex offense”
register, a category that includes five sub-categories.156 Also, for the first time,
juvenile offenders must register. Whereas Congress previously required that
juveniles convicted as adults register, the AWA requires that individuals age
fourteen or over adjudicated delinquent in the juvenile system for the following
151

Id. at S8029 (statement of Sen. Specter).
152 CONG. REC. H681 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of Rep. Brown-Waite).
153
152 CONG. REC. H5729 (daily ed. July 25, 2006) (statement of Rep. Udall).
154
Protecting Children from Violent Criminals and Sexual Predators: What Needs to be
Done? Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 19 (2005) (statement of Ernie Allen, President & CEO of The National Center
for Missing & Exploited Children).
155
Congress apparently wanted there to be no mistake about this, designating the subsection
for the category of registerable offenses the “Amie Zyla expansion of sex offense definition” (see 42
U.S.C. § 16911(5) (2006)) and “Expansion of definition of ‘specified offense against a minor’ to
include all offenses by child predators” (see 42 U.S.C. 16911(7) (2006)).
156
The AWA excludes from coverage any offense involving “consensual sexual conduct”—if
the victim was an adult, “unless the adult was under the custodial authority of the offender at the time
of the offense, or if the victim was at least 13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years
older than the victim.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C) (2006).
152
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offenses must register: (1) engaging in a sexual act with a child under the age of
twelve; (2) engaging in a sexual act with another by rendering unconscious or
involuntarily drugging the victim; (3) engaging in a sexual act with another by
force or the threat of serious violence; or (4) an attempt or conspiracy to commit
any of the aforementioned offenses.157 The AWA also requires, again for the first
time, that state registration laws encompass tribal and foreign nation
convictions.158
Eligible individuals now must register, keep their registration current, and
provide a new photo, in each place they live, go to school and work,159 and do so
before completing a sentence of imprisonment for a registerable offense or not
later than three business days after being sentenced for the offense if not sentenced
to prison.160 When they register, far more information must be collected,
including: social security number, employment and school location information,
finger and palm prints, a DNA sample, and vehicle license plate number and
description.161 Also, when registrants leave their home jurisdiction for seven or
more days, they must inform the jurisdiction as well as the destination
jurisdiction.162
The centerpiece of the AWA is its tier classification system. As noted above,
the federal Megan’s Law left to states the question of how registrants were to be
distinguished for purposes of registration requirements and community
notification, and merely noted several possible techniques, including the two chief
methods now used by states: one premised on the nature of the offender’s
conviction (“conviction-based”) and the other premised on an individualized risk
assessment (“risk-based”). The AWA prescribes use of a conviction-based
approach, based on a three-tiered registrant classification system:
• “Tier III sex offenders” are persons convicted of an offense punishable
by imprisonment for more than one year and whose offense:
 involves engaging in a sexual act with another by force or threat;
 occurs after the offender becomes a “tier II sex offender”; or

157

42 U.S.C. § 16911(8) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 16911(6) (2006). With respect to foreign convictions, the AWA specifies that
registration is not required if the conviction was “not obtained with sufficient safeguards for
fundamental fairness and due process for the accused,” as specified in guidelines to be issued by the
Attorney General. 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(B) (2006).
159
42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (2006). In addition, when initially registering, individuals must
register in the jurisdiction where s/he was convicted, if different from the jurisdiction in which s/he
resides. 42 U.S.C. § 16913(a) (2006).
160
42 U.S.C. § 16913(b) (2006).
161
42 U.S.C. § 16914(a) (2006).
162
Id. The AWA omits any mention of another emigrant population: long-distance truckers.
158
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 is comparable to or more severe than the following offenses, or a
conspiracy or attempt to commit the following federal offenses:
sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse; abusive sexual contact
against a minor under age 13; kidnapping of a minor (unless a
parent or guardian).
• “Tier II sex offenders” are persons other than “tier III sex offenders”
whose offense is punishable by imprisonment of more than one year
and whose offense:
 is comparable to or more severe than the following federal
offenses, or attempts or conspiracies to commit such offenses,
involving a minor: sex trafficking; coercion and enticement;
transportation with intent to engage in sexual activity; abusive
sexual contact; or
 “involves” use of a minor in a sexual performance, solicitation of a
minor to engage in a sexual performance, solicitation of a minor
to engage in prostitution, or production or distribution of child
pornography.
• “Tier I sex offenders” are eligible registrants other than “tier II” or “tier
III” sex offenders, a residual category covering misdemeanor
offenses warranting a year or less imprisonment.163
Under the AWA, tier designation determines duration of registration and the
intervals at which registration information must be verified and updated. Tier I
offenders must register for a minimum of fifteen years and verify their registration
on an annual basis in-person (prior law allowed for mail-in verification). Tier II
offenders must register for twenty-five years and verify information in-person
twice a year. Tier III offenders must register for their lifetimes and verify
information in-person four times a year. When verifying information, registrants
must also submit to a new photograph.164 Any changes to registration information
(e.g., home or work address) must be reported to at least one jurisdiction in which
the registrant resides, works or is enrolled in school, within three days of such
change.165
The AWA requires that all statutorily eligible registrants register without any
basis to challenge the registration requirement for the specified duration.166 In
163

42 U.S.C. § 16911(1)-(4) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 16916 (2006).
165
42 U.S.C. § 16913(c) (2006).
166
42 U.S.C. §§ 16915 (duration), 16916 (verification intervals) (2006). The AWA, specifies,
however, that certain individuals can have their designated registration periods reduced: (i) Tier I
registrants, reduced by five years if they have a “clean record” for 10 years (i.e., 10-year total
duration) and (ii) Tier III registrants who are juveniles, reduced to 25 years if “clean” for 25 years
(e.g., 25-year total duration). Id. § 16915(b)(2),(3). For a definition of “clean record” see id. §
16915(b)(1).
164
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addition, all registrants are automatically subject to community notification—at
least by means of Internet web sites that states are required to create and
maintain.167 “[A]ll information about each sex offender in the registry” is to be
made available, except for certain specified information (e.g., the victim’s name,
the registrant’s social security number).168 In turn, registrants’ information will be
included in and made available for public view on the Dru Sjodin National Sex
Offender Public Website maintained by the Attorney General.169
The AWA also adds new and harsher penalties for registration violations. For
the first time, federal law specifies a minimum penalty that states must impose for
registration violations—a maximum term of imprisonment in excess of one year.170
It also, again for the first time, imposes federal criminal liability for registration
violations.171 Invoking its Commerce Clause (as opposed to its Spending Clause)
authority, Congress has made it a federal crime for any individual required to
register to knowingly fail to do so or to fail to update registration, and “travel[] in
interstate or foreign commerce, or enter[] or leave[], or reside[], in, Indian
country.” Violators are subject to a $250,000 fine and maximum ten years in
federal prison.172 Furthermore, the AWA specifies that federal law enforcement,
including the U.S. Marshals Service, shall be used “to assist jurisdictions in
locating sex offenders and apprehending sex offenders who violate sex offender
registration requirements.”173 Pursuant to this authority, the Marshals Service has
since launched Operation FALCON,174 resulting in the arrest of hundreds of

167

42 U.S.C. § 16918(a) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 16918(b) (2006). The AWA provides that jurisdictions may exempt from
disclosure “any information about a tier I sex offender convicted of an offense other than a specified
offense against a minor”; the name (but not location) of a registrant’s employer; the name of the
institution where a registrant is a student; and any other information the Attorney General might
exempt. Id. § 16918(c).
169
42 U.S.C. § 16920 (2006).
170
42 U.S.C. § 16913(e) (2006). Indian tribes, however, because their justice systems lack
authority to impose in excess of six months incarceration, are exempt from this requirement. Id. §
16912(2).
171
See United States v. Smith, 481 F. Supp. 2d 846, 849 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (quoting H.R. Rep.
No. 109-218, at 36 (2005)) (noting that AWA “created ‘a new Federal crime’ where ‘[s]ex offenders
who fail to comply will face felony criminal prosecution.’”).
172
18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). In addition, individuals who commit a “crime of violence” under
federal law, the law of the District of Columbia, tribal law, or the law of any U.S. territory of
possession, while unregistered, face a minimum of five years and a maximum of thirty years. Id. §
2250(c).
173
42 U.S.C. § 16941(a) (2006).
174
See Operation FALCON, http://www.usdoj.gov/marshals/falcon/index.html. (last visited
September 5, 2008). The acronym represents “Federal and Local Cops Organized Nationally.”
168
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individuals for alleged registration violations, and in late April 2007 the first
sentence was handed down in federal court for a registration violation.175
In addition, the AWA lays the foundation for a far more comprehensive and
uniform national registry. Each state must provide the Attorney General with
information on registrants,176 which will be maintained in the National Sex
Offender Registry to be operated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and made
available to all jurisdictions (yet not the public).177 The Attorney General, in turn,
must maintain the Dru Sjodin National Sex Offender Public Website, noted above,
containing information on all of the nation’s registrants. The AWA specifies that
the website shall allow, at a minimum, “the public to obtain relevant information
for each sex offender by a single query for any given zip code or geographical
radius set by the user.”178
Furthermore, the AWA creates a new federal bureaucratic apparatus to
administer and monitor registration. It authorizes a Sex Offender Management
Assistance grant program to help states implement and satisfy new requirements,
with bonus payments for early implementation.179 In addition, it establishes a Sex
Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering and Tracking
(SMART) Office within the Department of Justice to administer standards and
grants, as well as assist states with compliance.180 The AWA also imposes a series
of reporting requirements on various federal entities. The Attorney General must
annually report to Congress on state efforts to comply with the AWA, and the role
of the Marshal’s Service and federal prosecutors in enforcing the new federal
failure-to register law.181 The Attorney General is directed to assemble a task force
to study and report on the “efficiency and effectiveness” of risk versus convictionbased classification regimes and various means to reduce sex offender

175

See Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, Sex-Offender Sentence Tests Adam Walsh Law, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Apr. 26, 2007 (discussing case of Wilfredo Madera, who had moved from New York to
Florida without registering with Florida authorities).
176
42 U.S.C. § 16921 (2006).
177
42 U.S.C. § 16919 (2006).
178
42 U.S.C. § 16920(a) (2006).
179
42 U.S.C. § 16926(c) (2006). The effort was not unprecedented: in March 1998 the Bureau
of Justice Statistics, part of the U.S. Department of Justice, created the National Sex Offender
Registry Assistance Program, intended to help states in satisfying federal directives starting with the
Wetterling Act. The “Sex Offender Monitoring Assistance Program” provided funds based on the
“annual number of sex offenders registered.” See Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act
of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, § 607(i)(2)(B)(i), 112 Stat. 2974, 2985-86 (1998) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 14071 (2000)). Under this approach, it bears mention, small population states were
disadvantaged and all states were provided an incentive to expand their registry rolls, even if not
supported by sound policy rationale, and indeed even if registry information was incorrect.
180
42 U.S.C. § 16945 (2006).
181
42 U.S.C. § 16991 (2006).
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recidivism.182 The National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the
Department of Justice, must by 2011 (with annual interim reports) conduct a
comprehensive study the costs, effectiveness, and possible ways to improve
registration and community notification.183 The AWA also authorizes a variety of
grants to assist states in enforcing registration requirements184 and address
verification of registrants in particular.185
Finally, the AWA, like predecessor laws, is augmented by guidelines
promulgated by the Attorney General. Whereas prior express delegations of
congressional authority relative to registration and notification were quite modest,
the AWA confers broad authority to “issue guidelines and regulations to interpret
and implement” the law’s provisions.186 Pursuant to this authority the Attorney
General has issued extensive guidelines on the nature and scope of the AWA,
including the critically important issue of its retroactive application.187 As
interpreted by the Attorney General, the AWA applies to all individuals covered by
its terms, including those whose convictions predate its enactment in July 2006.
The guidelines specify that states must register statutorily eligible individuals who
are incarcerated or under supervision, either for the registration-triggering offense
or some other crime; already registered or subject to a pre-existing state
registration provision; and (perhaps most significant) reenter the state’s criminal
justice system as a result of any conviction—including for a non-registerable
offense.188
The upshot of the AWA is that the U.S. has mandated a considerable array of
changes in state laws, including:
the range of offenses covered (e.g., “sexual contact”; possessing child
pornography; and misdemeanors);
● the retroactive extent of registration;
● the duration or registration (e.g., fifteen-year minimum and new 25year category);
● the capacity of statutorily eligible individuals to appeal and perhaps
avoid registration;
● the registration of juveniles;
●

182

Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 637, 638, 120 Stat. 587, 643–644 (2006).
Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 634, 120 Stat. 587, 643–644 (2006).
184
42 U.S.C. § 3797 (2003).
185
42 U.S.C. § 16988 (2006).
186
42 U.S.C. § 16912(b) (2006).
187
Final Guidelines for Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006,
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), July 1, 2008, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/final_sornaguidelines.pdf [hereinafter AWA Final Guidelines].
188
Id. at 8.
183
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the information that must be provided (e.g., employer and school
information, DNA sample);
the frequency and method registration and updates are to occur (inperson);
the jurisdictional origin of convictions (e.g., foreign governments,
Indian tribes);
the geographic locations in which registration must occur (residence,
employment, school);
the penalties for registration violations (in excess of a year);
the scope of registrants subject to community notification, via the
Internet at a minimum, pursuant to an “conviction-based”
classification scheme; and
the amount and type of information subject to public dissemination.

As in the past, Congress afforded states a period of time to comply with new
federal mandates. The AWA specifies that jurisdictions have three years from the
law’s effective date, July 27, 2006, to “substantially implement” its terms (as
determined by the Attorney General), and thus avoid losing ten percent of Byrne
Grant funds.189 If past experience can serve as a guide, federal pressure will have
considerable influence. As a result of financial pressure imposed by Wetterling in
1994, a time when thirty-eight states had registration laws,190 by 1996 all states had
registries (when Massachusetts passed its law).191 Likewise, in May 1996, when
Megan’s Law was adopted, only thirty states required community notification in
some form,192 but by 1999 all states had laws (when New Mexico passed its
law).193
Conformity, however, has not always been seamless, with resistance reflected
in several ways, including passively, with states acknowledging that conforming
legislation was motivated by a concern over losing grant money, rather than
endorsement of the federal policies themselves.194 At other times, state officials
189
42 U.S.C. §§ 16924, 16925. Alternatively, jurisdictions have one year after the Attorney
General makes available computer software for the establishment and operation of “uniform sex
offender registries and Internet sites,” if the software is available later than July 2009. Id. § 16923(a).
The Attorney General is also authorized to permit one-two year extensions of the deadline. Id. §
16924(b).
190
James Popkin & John Simons, Natural Born Predators, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept.
11, 1994, at 64, available at http.//www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/940919/archive_013400print.htm.
191
Doris Sue Wong, Weld Signs Bill Creating Sex-Offender Registry—Those Convicted Have
to Register, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 6, 1996, at B2.
192
See 142 CONG. REC. S4921 (daily ed. May 9, 1996) (statement of Sen. Dole).
193
Roundhouse Roundup, ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Mar. 13, 1999, at D5.
194
See, e.g., State v. Chun, 76 P.3d 935, 940 (Haw. 2003) (citing language in Hawaii
legislative debates).
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have publicly criticized federal strictures and expressed resentment over being
subject to what they considered unfunded federal mandates,195 have been slow to
comply,196 and, in isolated instances, failed to wholly codify individual federal
requirements.197 Whether there will be full compliance with the AWA provisions
will not be clear until at least late July 2009, the deadline set by Congress.198
While six states hurriedly took steps to enact the AWA,199 in order to be eligible to
receive “early bonus” payments authorized (but not yet allocated) by Congress,200
others have expressed reservations, raising particular concern over the AWA’s
insistence that juveniles be registered201 and the law’s retroactive scope.202 As the
195

See, e.g., Kirk Mitchell & Sean Kelly, Predator or Just an Offender? A Colorado Law is
Supposed to Inform Neighbors When High-Risk Sexual Offenders Move Nearby. But It’s Been Used
Rarely and Works Poorly—Some Say By Design, DENVER POST, May 29, 2005, at A1 (noting relative
laxness of Colorado’s law compared to others and quoting state official as saying that state adopted
community notification only under federal pressure); Mary K. Reinhart, New U.S. Law Puts Teen Sex
Offenders on the Web, EAST VALLEY TRIB. (Mesa, Ariz.), Sept. 13, 2007 (noting that Arizona
lawmakers and officials “suggested that the [AWA] might cost more than [Byrne funds] to
implement”).
196
See Federal Funds at Stake for 14 States with Megan’s Law Problems, 27 LAW
ENFORCEMENT NEWS 7 (Nov. 30, 2001) (noting Alabama, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington).
197
Colorado, for instance, failed to require registration of persons convicted of non-parent
kidnapping and false imprisonment of a minor, despite Wetterling’s contrary requirements. See
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-22-101 (2006). California and Delaware qualified that any kidnapping or
false imprisonment be sexually motivated. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(2)(A) (2008); DEL. STAT.
Tit. 11 § 4121(4)(A) (2007). See generally U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics,
Summary of State Offender Registries, 2001 (March 2002, NCJ 192265) (noting jurisdictions with
divergent provisions).
198
See 42 U.S.C. § 16924(a)(1) (2007). The Guidelines, critically important for the detail and
guidance they provide on the AWA, were not issued even in proposed form until May 2007, and were
not released in final form until July 2008. Presumably, in light of this tardiness, at a minimum the
Department of Justice will be obliged to invoke the AWA’s discretionary one-year grace period. See
id. § 16924(b). Moreover, as noted, jurisdictions have one year after the Attorney General makes
available necessary computer software, and if the software is available later than July 2009, the
Attorney General is authorized to permit up to two one-year extensions. Id. § 16924(b).
199
See John Gramlich, Will States Say “No” to the Adam Walsh Act?, available at
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=273887 (noting Delaware, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi, Nevada, and Ohio). The Attorney General, however, determined for undisclosed reasons
that Louisiana’s codification failed to satisfy the AWA. Id.
200
See, e.g., Executive Order Number 35: Gov. Riley Creates Governor’s Community
Notification Task Force, Aug. 27, 2007 available at http://governorpress.alabama.gov/pr/ex-35-200708-29.asp (noting initiative by Alabama governor to enact AWA early and secure bonus).
201
See, e.g., Steve Peoples, Legislators Look to Toughen Sex-Offender Laws, PROVIDENCE J.,
Aug. 1, 2007, at B1 (R.I.); Luige del Puerto, Arizona Officials Express Concerns Over Federal Sex
Registry Law, ARIZONA CAPITOL TIMES, Nov. 30, 2007 (Ariz.); Lisa Sandberg, Sex Registry Called
too Harsh for Juveniles, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 17, 2008 (Tex.).
202
See, e.g., Peoples, supra note 201 (R.I.).

84

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 6:51

cost of implementing mandates becomes clearer, even among states with
conviction-based regimes like that of the AWA, further resistance can be
expected.203
C. Federal Motivations Scrutinized
From 1994–2006, the U.S. engaged in a sustained effort to force registration
and community notification upon the states. Over time, federal prescriptions have
become ever more exacting, culminating with the AWA, which contains the most
ambitious requirements to date.204 This zenith resulted from congressional concern
that state registration and community notification laws were “weak” and fraught
with “loopholes,” and that their diverse nature created a “patchwork” permitting
registrants to evade continued scrutiny, especially as a result of inter-state travel.
These assertions, however, remain questionable.
As a threshold matter, the issue of “weak” state laws presupposes a
knowledge base not yet in existence. Remarkably, almost twenty years after
Washington State adopted its Community Protection Act of 1990, marking the
modern resurgence of registration and the genesis of community notification,
precious little effort has been dedicated to testing the mainstay suppositions that
the laws: (1) deter registrants from re-offending, based on the belief that they are
being watched; (2) enhance the ability of police to investigate and perhaps prevent
acts of recidivism, based on knowledge of the whereabouts of registrants; and (3)
empower community members with information on registrants, permitting them to
take protective action and perhaps assist law enforcement in the monitoring of
registrants.205 Indeed, not until the AWA did Congress expressly mandate
evaluation of the core issue of the relative effectiveness of risk and convictionbased registrant classification schemes206 and the effectiveness and costs of

203
For instance, when Oklahoma revamped its conviction-based system in accord with the
AWA, 78% of registrants fell into the Tier III category, requiring lifetime registration and in-person
updates every ninety days. See KOTV.com, Laws Targeting Sex Offenders Take Effect (Nov. 1,
2007), http://www.newson6.com/GLOBAL/story.asp?s=7732295.
According to one recent study, in all jurisdictions the estimated first-year costs of implementing
the AWA will outweigh the cost of lost Byrne funds, often by substantial degree. In Virginia, for
instance, it is estimated that first-year compliance would cost over $12 million while Byrne Grant
losses would be roughly $400,000. See Justice Policy Institute, What Will It Cost States to Comply
with
the
Sex
Offender
Registration
and
Notification
Act?
(2008),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/08-08_FAC_SORNACOSTS_JJ.pdf.
204
See AWA Final Guidelines, supra note 187, at 72 (noting that the AWA “is more
comprehensive and contemplates greater uniformity among jurisdictions than [prior laws] …in that it
generally establishes a higher national baseline.”).
205
For an overview of the limited research conducted to date see LOGAN, supra note 7, ch. 5.
206
See 42 U.S.C. § 16991 [P.L. 109-248, § 637] (to be conducted by the Attorney General).
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registration and notification more generally.207 This—twelve years after Congress
began imposing registration and community notification on the states, and after the
AWA itself mandated that states adopt a conviction-based scheme.
Congressional concern over “loopholes” leading to the frequently quoted
figure of over 100,000 “missing” registrants (itself an unverified estimate) is no
more persuasive. As has so often been the case, the scenarios publicly advanced
on the House or Senate floor as evidencing the need for a legislative fix were
inapposite.208 With the AWA, the February 2005 rape and murder of nine-year-old
Jessica Lunsford served as a prime catalyst. According to Representative Ginny
Brown-Waite (R-FL), the tragedy could have been avoided if provisions such as
contained in the AWA had been in place.209 John Couey, a registrant ultimately
convicted of the crime, however, was “missing” because he failed to notify
authorities of his residence change within Florida.210 The AWA’s provisions of
particular relevance, its in-person verification requirement and heightened
penalties for non-compliance, would have been of no effect, given that Couey
could still have deceived authorities as to his address and Florida’s penalty at the
time (up to five years) exceeded that required by the AWA. The solution, if any,
lay in enforcement by Florida authorities of Florida law (like the AWA, a
conviction-based regime, among the nation’s toughest),211 and mandated home
visits by police, the latter not required by the AWA. As with other federal criminal
justice policy efforts212 and environmental policy,213 empirically unsupported
supposition fueled federal policy.
207

See 42 U.S.C. § 16990 [P.L. 109-248, § 634] (to be conducted by the National Justice of

Justice).
208

For instance, the identity of neither Adam Walsh nor Jacob Wetterling’s killer has ever
been identified, and it remains unknown whether the boys were sexually victimized, undercutting the
premise that recidivist sex offenders should be targeted by the laws.
209
See 151 Cong. Rec. H7880 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2005) (statement of Rep. Brown-Waite);
House Bills on Sexual Crimes Against Children: Hearing on H.R. 764, H.R. 95, H.R. 1505, H.R.
2423, H.R. 2796, and H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11–13, 23 (2005) (statement of Rep. BrownWaite).
210
Robert Farley et al., For Police, Tracking Sex Offenders Can Get Tricky, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, at 3A.
211
See Top Ten Reviews Sex Offender Registry Review, http://sex-offender-registryreview.toptenreviews.com/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2007) (providing state-by-state assessment of rigor
of registration regimes).
212
Aimee’s Law, enacted by Congress in 2000, is one such example. See 42 U.S.C. § 13713
(2000). The law was premised on the belief that violent offenders, released prematurely from states,
travel to other states to commit crimes. Subsequent research by the Department of Justice, however,
was unable to demonstrate the occurrence. Using a 1994 cohort based on a sample of over 9000
offenders released in 13 states, only 31 committed a sex crime in another state. See Letter from
Acting Assistant Attorney General James H. Clinger to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, Dec. 26,
2006 (on file with author). The program itself was never funded and implementing guidelines have
not been issued by the Attorney General.
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Congressional concern over the “patchwork” of inadequate state laws
(ironically, itself permitted by the “floor” imposed by federal law), theoretically
fostering travel-evasion by registrants motivated to escape more onerous state
requirements, is also questionable. Not only does the concern bespeak existence of
an optimal registration and community notification regime, again itself an open
question, but also the phenomenon of travel-evasion itself. While over the years
some anecdotal evidence has existed of registrants forum-shopping for a more
lenient state residence, no statistical evidence exists of the occurrence.
But even if it were shown to exist, basis would still exist to question
congressional intervention. Unlike other contexts in which federal intrusion has
perhaps been justified, what might be considered weak state registration laws do
not impose externalities on their fellow sovereigns. Rather, any weakness—
presumably resulting in enhanced recidivism risks among registrants—would
mainly be shouldered by residents of the weak state; negative outcomes would be
internalized, not externalized. As discussed below, if a state is willing to be seen
as a magnet for convicted sex offenders, based on exercise of its sovereign
legislative authority, then federalism protects that choice. Presumably, citizens
aggrieved by the prospect will move to a jurisdiction ostensibly less amenable to
registrants, and target-hardening will naturally occur among states wishing to
preserve their citizen base.214 Moreover, even if New York’s law is thought weak,
and a New York registrant one afternoon ventures to Connecticut to commit a sex
crime, it is hard to see how the AWA’s more onerous requirements (e.g., in-person
verification) will either (i) stop him from doing so or (ii) protect Connecticut’s
residents against such victimization.215
In this respect, federal registration and notification laws are unlike their
environmental counterparts, which seek to limit possible state proclivities toward
lax pollution standards, to the disadvantage of other states,216 and federal firearm
laws, which seek to limit the spillover harms in other states associated with lax
213
See Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Environmental Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal
Role in Environmental Protection, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 93 (2004) (noting how federal
environmental laws were prompted by false understanding of state under-enforcement and mythology
surrounding the 1969 fire on the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland).
214
In reality, little evidence of this reaction thus far exists, with states such as Arkansas, New
York, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Washington maintaining their risk-based regimes, amid a dearth
of local political agitation for change.
215
The shortcoming, of course, is a long-perceived one relative to registration and community
notification in general, adding to the commonly expressed view that the laws only foster a false sense
of security (for this and other reasons). See LOGAN, supra note 7, ch. 5.
216
See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 14 U. PA.
L. REV. 2341 (1996). Whether such externalities actually incite a race-to-the-bottom of state
environmental laxness, warranting federal intervention, has long been disputed. See Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV.
553, 556 n.2 (2001) (citing articles advancing and critiquing the race-to-the-bottom assessment).
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firearm regulation.217 If anything, states are wary of being perceived as being soft
The risk is thus not political laxness but rather
on sex offenders.218
overzealousness—a race not to the “bottom” but to the “top” (defined by evertougher state laws).
Finally, perversely, federal action might actually result in less demanding
state registration and notification policy. It remains unclear, for instance, whether
the conviction-based approach mandated by the AWA is so over-inclusive as to
undercut the desired goal of public vigilance.219 Concern also exists that the
approach might enhance the prospects of recidivism among law-abiding exoffenders, who while not being prone to recidivate, might do so as a result of the
negative consequences of community notification.220 As the North Dakota registry
web site stated in October 2007 in justifying the state’s use of its risk-based
regime, the “public notification of other offenders may have the unintended
consequence of making them more risky.”221 Moreover, the conviction-based
approach required by the AWA actually might be less inclusive, such as when an
individual pleads guilty to a lesser offense. Whereas a risk-based regime might
capture such an individual on the basis of an individualized assessment,222 the
AWA would not because the plea basis will drive classification—and hence
duration of registration and notification, the intervals of verification, and other
matters.223

217

See Kristin A. Goss, Policy, Politics, and Paradox: The Institutional Origins of the Great
American Gun War, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 681, 700 (2004).
218
This “NIMBY” predisposition is vividly evidenced in the recent wave of state (and local)
laws imposing sharp geographic restrictions on where registrants can live. See Wayne A. Logan,
Constitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2006).
219
As the Supreme Court observed in an unrelated context, “when everything is classified,
then nothing is classified, and the system becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the
careless….” New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). See also In re Registrant E.I., 693 A.2d 505, 508 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“[I]f
Megan’s Law is applied literally and mechanically to virtually all sexual offenders, the beneficial
purpose of this law will be impeded.”).
220
See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification: Emerging
Legal and Research Issues, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING AND MANAGEMENT
337, 343–44 (N.Y. Academy of Sciences, 2003).
221
See North Dakota Sex Offender Registry, North Dakota Sex Offender Web Site,
http://www.sexoffender.nd.gov/FAQ/faq.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2007).
222
For instance, such would the possible outcome in Arkansas.
223
A solution might lie in adoption of a provision similar to that in Minnesota, which permits
registration on the basis of a specified registerable offense “or another offense arising out of the same
set of circumstances.” MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166 subd. 1b(1).
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III. FEDERALISM CONSEQUENCES
As the foregoing makes clear, since 1994 the federal government has been in
engaged in an ongoing effort to impose its will on the states on a matter of
undisputed state concern—the community control of convicted sex offenders.
With the Wetterling Act (1994) and Megan’s Law (1996), the U.S. required that all
states adopt registration and community notification laws. Federal policy,
according to guidelines promulgated by the Attorney General, provided a
substantive “floor” for states on which they could impose more stringent
requirements. With the AWA (2006), the federal government greatly expanded the
“floor” of registration and community notification requirements, seeking more in
the way of “uniform standards” for registration and community notification,224
with the ultimate goal of securing a “comprehensive national system.”225 The shift
was plainly not lost on Congress, with members being at pains to emphasize that
the AWA’s provisions “constitute, in relation to States, only conditions required to
avoid the reduction of Federal funding,”226 a clear nod to concern that the AWA’s
prescriptions might run afoul of the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering
prohibition.227 Congress also invoked its Commerce Clause authority, for the first
time making it a federal crime to cross states lines and fail to register.228 This Part
examines the federalism implications of these developments.
A. State Autonomy
Traditionally, federalism, in its vertical (state-federal) form, has been thought
to serve a variety of purposes, with state autonomy certainly figuring foremost.229
Federal registration and community notification requirements have indisputably
infringed this autonomy.230 With the AWA, federal intrusiveness has reached a
224

Activities Report of the Committee of the Judiciary, S. REP. NO. 109-369, at 16 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
226
42 U.S.C. § 16925(d) (2006).
227
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
228
42 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(2)(B) (2006).
229
See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 928 (“[i]t is an essential attribute of the States’ retained
sovereignty that they remain independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.”);
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (stressing that states possess a “separate and
independent autonomy”).
230
The discussion here is limited to the AWA’s impact on the states. However, the AWA also
significantly impinges on the autonomy of tribes, Puerto Rico, and U.S. territories. For more on the
effects of the AWA on tribal sovereignty, which requires that tribes either create their own regimes or
submit to those of a state, see Virginia Davis & Kevin Washburn, Sex Offender Registration in Indian
Country, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 3 (2008). See also Timothy J. Droske, The New Battleground for
Public Law 280 Jurisdiction: Sex Offender Registration in Indian Country, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 897
(2007).
225
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high water mark, requiring major changes to state laws, for instance subjecting
certain juveniles to registration and notification and requiring in-person
registration verification.231 The AWA also mandates that states employ a
conviction-based, tier approach to registrant classification. The majority of states
using an undifferentiated conviction-based approach will need to enact more
refined laws that draw distinctions consistent with the AWA. The dozen or so
states that employ risk-based schemes based on individualized evaluation will need
to radically overhaul their regimes.
In mandating the comprehensive standards contained in the AWA, Congress
did, to its credit, manifest some sensitivity to state autonomy. The AWA expressly
provides that a state need not adopt any aspect of the AWA if doing so “would
place the jurisdiction in violation of its constitution, as determined by a ruling of
the jurisdiction’s highest court.”232 If such a constitutional conflict does exist, “the
Attorney General and the jurisdiction shall make good faith efforts to accomplish
substantial implementation of [the law] and to reconcile any conflicts” between the
AWA and the jurisdiction’s constitution.233 Under the AWA, “the Attorney
General shall consult” with state officials “concerning the jurisdiction’s
interpretation of the jurisdiction’s constitution and the ruling thereon by the
jurisdiction’s highest court.”234
Sensitivity to state autonomy, however, only goes so far. No respect, for
instance, is paid to state legislative or executive branch determinations. Only a
constitutionally commanded position, backed by a holding from the state’s highest
court (and seemingly not even a lowly intermediate appellate court), will suffice.
Moreover, the U.S. promises to “work with the jurisdiction to see whether the
problem can be overcome . . .”235—surely an unceremonious way to refer to a
state-based constitutional right. If a jurisdiction fails to “substantially implement”
the AWA, in the absence of a legitimate “demonstrated inability to implement”
based on domestic constitutional dictate, or otherwise cannot satisfy the U.S. with
an accommodation, it will lose its federal funding. Adding insult to injury, the
share lost by a jurisdiction will be reallocated to other more compliant states.

231
It might also require changes in the substantive criminal law of states, such as when a state
defines a minor as someone other than less than eighteen years of age, as specified by the AWA.
232
42 U.S.C. § 16925(b)(1) (2006).
233
Id. § 16925(b)(2). The Final Guidelines for the AWA afford some apparent wriggle room
for the Department’s assessment of “substantial implementation,” stating that the standard
“contemplate[s] that there is some latitude to approve a jurisdiction’s implementation efforts, even if
they do not exactly follow in all respects the specifications” of the AWA and the Guidelines. AWA
Final Guidelines, supra note 187, at 10.
234
42 U.S.C. § 16925(b)(2) (2006).
235
AWA Final Guidelines, supra note 187, at 11(emphasis added).
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Disrespect for state autonomy has been particularly evident in the exercise of
rule-making authority delegated to the Attorney General.236 In the wake of the
AWA’s enactment in July 2006 the Attorney General, under the auspices of a new
entity created by the AWA—the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring,
Apprehending, Registering, and Tracking (“SMART”)237—has issued a series of
proposed and final guidelines. In February 2007, the Attorney General acted upon
his specifically delegated authority,238 suspended customary notice and comment
requirements, and issued an “interim rule” with immediate effect,239 ordaining that
the AWA was to be retroactive in scope,240 a policy with huge implications for
states. In May 2007, the Attorney General issued proposed guidelines for the
AWA as a whole, addressing a wide range of issues, as well as elaborating on the
contours of retroactivity.241

236

See 42 U.S.C. § 16912(b) (2006) (“The Attorney General shall issue guidelines and
regulations to interpret and implement this title.”); id. at § 16914(a)(7) (providing that the Attorney
General has the authority to expand the scope of information, specified by the AWA, that registrants
must provide state authorities for inclusion in their registries). The AWA also provides that the
Attorney General has the authority to augment the kinds of information falling under the AWA’s list
of “mandatory exemptions” from community notification (e.g., the social security numbers of
registrants). Id. at § 16918(b)(4).
237
42 U.S.C. § 16945(a) (2006). The SMART Office is headed by a director appointed by the
President, who reports to the Attorney General through staff in the Office of Justice Programs. Id. §
16945(b). The SMART Office has the authority to:
(1) administer the standards for the sex offender registration and community notification
program;
(2) administer grant programs authorized by the AWA;
(3) cooperate with and provide technical assistance to the States, units of local
government, tribes, and other entities in relation to registration and community
notification and other measures intended to protect the public against sexual abuse and
exploitation; and
(4) perform other functions specified by the Attorney General.
Id. § 16945(c).
238
See 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d) (2006) (“The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify
the applicability of the requirements of this title to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of
this Act….”).
239
The exception can be invoked if an agency finds “good cause” and establishes that the
customary protocol would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2006). To this end, the Attorney General emphasized the dangers presented
by delay as a result of not registering individuals with pre-enactment convictions, see 28 C.F.R. Pt.
72 (2007), a not altogether convincing explanation given that the provision was to take effect six
months to the day after the AWA’s enactment and thirteen years after the Wetterling Act, not to
mention the two-year pendency of the AWW itself and the reality that persons targeted possibly had
not committed a sexual offense for many years.
240
See 72 Fed. Reg. 8894 (Feb. 28, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 72).
241
See 72 Fed. Reg. 30209 (May 30, 2007) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. 82).
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The guidelines were the subject of a forum hosted by SMART from July 24–
27, 2007 in Indianapolis, Indiana,242 just before the announced deadline to submit
public comments.243 The comments received reflect considerable frustration and
concern over the substance of the guidelines as well as the process employed in
their creation. For instance, a letter from the chair of Idaho’s Criminal Justice
Commission expressed concern over the “breadth of the duties of the state”
resulting from the retroactivity requirement, calling it “an onerous and unworkable
burden on the state and its limited resources.”244 A letter jointly signed by the
heads of six New York State agencies concerned with implementation of the law
urged that jurisdictions be afforded discretion on the retroactivity question:
When each state first created its sex offender registry, it made a choice
about how the registration requirements would be applied to previously
convicted offenders.
The decision on retroactive applicability raises substantial practical and
policy concerns that are more appropriately addressed by the individual
states. [Part of the guidelines] will greatly expand the pool of registerable
sex offenders in New York State. It will also require the state to search
the prior criminal history of each person entering the criminal justice
system to determine whether, at any time in the past, he or she was
convicted of, or adjudicated for, a qualifying sex offense. This is both
burdensome and unworkable because in many case older records will no
longer be available, or they will be incomplete or inaccurate.245
In addition, the New York letter elaborated, retroactivity expands the pool of
registerable offenders, which will serve to “exacerbate the difficulties that states
are now facing in finding appropriate housing for sex offenders.”246
The SMART office also received extensive criticism on the substance of the
AWA itself. Many jurisdictions expressed major concern over the AWA’s
requirement that juvenile offenders register and be subject to community
notification.247 New York’s letter, for instance, emphasized that requiring
242

The author was present at the gathering.
The deadline for comments on the proposed interim role on retroactivity ended on April 30,
2007; the deadline for the proposed guidelines ended on August 1, 2007.
244
Letter from Brent D. Reinke, Chairman, Idaho Criminal Justice Commission, to Laura
Rogers,
Director
SMART
(July
31,
2007),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/pdfs/guideline_comments.pdf. [hereinafter AWA Comments].
245
Letter from Denise O’Donnell, Commissioner NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services
et al., to Laura Rogers, Director, SMART (July 31, 2007), AWA Comments, id.
246
Id.
247
See, e.g., Letter from W.S. Flaherty, Superintendent of Virginia State Police, to Laura
Rogers, Director, SMART (July 31, 2007); Letter from Jeanne Smith, Co-Chair Colorado of Adam
243
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consultation of prior juvenile records, many of which have been sealed or
expunged, was especially problematic because it contradicted “New York’s long
standing policy that recognizes that young offenders have a strong potential for
rehabilitation, and can be more effectively redirected into becoming productive
citizens if they are not stigmatized as criminal or registered sex offenders.”248 “For
many states, including New York, [the juvenile registration provision] will require
a substantial change in the treatment of juvenile offenders.”
More specific concerns raised by states included:
• objections to the requirement that registrants’ vehicle identification
information be made publicly available249;
• the posting of offenders convicted of incest, which would permit the
possible identification of victims250;
• the interpretive and documentation difficulties associated with having
registration based on convictions in other states251 and especially
foreign nations252;
• the interpretive difficulties associated with the need to incorporate
convictions under aged laws (especially in other states)253 and
Walsh Compliance Committee, to Laura Rogers, Director, SMART (July 16, 2007); Letter from Jeff
Shimkus, Indiana Sex Offender Registration and Notification Team, “Feedback on Proposed
Guidelines” to SMART; E-mail from Liane M. Moriyama, Hawaii Criminal Justice Data Center,
“State of Hawaii Response to the National Sex Offender Registration Act (SORNA) 2006, to
GetSMART (via email dated Aug. 6, 2007); California’s Comments on the Proposed National
Guidelines to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, attached to e-mail sent by
California Deputy Attorney General Janet Neeley, to GetSMART (July 26, 2007) [hereinafter
California Comments]; Letter from Robert S. Yeates, Executive Director Utah Commission on
Criminal and Juvenile Justice, David Karp, Senior Counsel, Office of Legal Policy (March 28, 2007);
Letter from Toney Newman, Alaska Division of Juvenile Justice, to Laura Rogers, Director
GetSMART (Aug. 1, 2007); Letter from Richard A. Smith, Vermont Department of Children and
Family Services, to Laura Rogers, Director SMART (July 27, 2007); Letter from Michael Hall,
Executive Director New Mexico Sentencing Commission, to Laura Rogers, Director, SMART (July
30, 2007). The aforementioned comments are contained in AWA Comments, supra note 244.
248
O’Donnell, supra note 245.
249
Shimkus, supra note 247 (contending that the information be available only to law
enforcement due to concern over “public panic” and the possibility that the information would “taint
eyewitness accounts” of abductions); Flaherty, supra note 247 (noting numerous problems).
250
California Comments, supra note 247.
251
Moriyama, supra note 247; Shimkus, supra note 247.
252
Moriyama, supra note 247.
253
E-mail from Diane Sherman, Michigan Criminal Justice Information Center, Michigan
Department of State Police, “Comments on SORNA Proposed Guidelines,” to SMART (Aug. 6,
2007), contained in AWA Comments, supra note 244 (“[r]etroactivity puts a work load burden on
states.
Much research will be needed on old laws to determine whether they apply
to…registration.”); California Comments, supra note 247 (asserting that creation of a database
containing superseded statutes of California and other states “is not a feasible project”).
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records that do not always specify the precise nature of the offense
(e.g., the age of the victim, an important factor under the AWA)254;
• the three-day time period in which change of addresses by registrants
must be reported255 ;
• the requirement that states post new registration information within
three days256; and
• the requirement that registration information be updated in-person.257
States also offered more global concerns. Virginia’s letter, for instance, closed by
stating that the “proposed regulations would be extremely cumbersome to
implement and cause Virginia to devote significant resources to the collection of
information which would be of limited use. Those states with strong registration
programs should have the option of implementing the proposed regulations.”258
In a lengthy submission, covering ten specific concerns raised by the AWA
and the proposed guidelines, the National Conference of State Legislatures
excoriated SMART, writing that the guidelines “compound the burdensome,
preemptive scheme of the underlying law they seek to clarify.” Furthermore, the
NCSL stated that it was
deeply concerned by the refusal of the SMART office to include them in
the drafting and decision-making process. The drafting process should
be a dialogue between the SMART office personnel and the impacted
stakeholders, such as NCSL, and not the product of unelected
government officials’ unilateral decisions…[T]he process should be a
give and take and not a decision made in a bureaucratic vacuum without
the knowledge and expertise of those who would be impacted the most
by such an obtrusive and overtly preemptive requirement.259
In a posting provided on its website, stating the position adopted by the group,
the NCSL similarly condemned the AWA’s “one-size-fits-all approach,” adding
that

254

California Comments, supra note 247.
Sherman, supra note 253 (recommending that period be five days, in light of difficulties
registrants can have in securing identification, and asserting that the AWA “should make it easier to
register not harder.”).
256
California Comments, supra note 247 (requirement is “not feasible”).
257
Moriyama, supra note 247.
258
Flaherty, supra note 247.
259
Letter from Carl Tubbesing, Deputy Executive Director National Conference of State
Legislatures, to Laura Rogers, Director, SMART (July 30, 2007), contained in AWA Comments,
supra note 244.
255
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These provisions preempt many state laws and create an unfunded
mandate for states because there are no appropriations in the Act or in
any appropriations bill. Many of the provisions of the Adam Walsh Act
were crafted without state input or consideration of current state
practices. The mandates imposed by the Adam Walsh Act are inflexible
and, in some instances, not able to be implemented.260
In early July 2008, thirteen months after being proposed, and well after the
projected three-month period of revision, the Final AWA Guidelines were released
by the Attorney General. Running sixty pages in length, the Final Guidelines
reflected little substantive change from those initially proposed,261 with the
Attorney General rebuffing state concerns either because they contradicted the
terms of the AWA itself or failed to qualify as persuasive bases to alter proposed
guideline requirements.262 In response to state requests to loosen the AWA’s
requirement of “substantial implementation,” the Attorney General stated that
doing so would “effectively treat [the AWA] as a set of suggestions for furthering
public safety in relation to released sex offenders, which would be dispensed with
based on arguments that other approaches would further that general objective,
though not encompassing the specific minimum measures that [the AWA]
260

See
National
Conference
of
State
Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/statefed/LAWANDJ.HTM (last visited August 30, 2008). A similar sentiment
was expressed in 1998 by a member of the Connecticut General Assembly, who stated that federal
directives had “more to do with the needs of the home States of the various congressional committee
chairs than they do with our States. I think this has been a source of great frustration for many State
legislators around the country . . . ‘One-size-fits-all’ Federal requirements really do not apply . . . .”
Mike Lawlor, Creating Effective Sex Offender Legislation Requires Collaboration Between
Lawmakers and Justice Agencies, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 110 (U.S.
Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 1998).
261
Policy on juvenile registration is a notable exception. In response to vigorous state
objections, based on a technical reading of the AWA that would require registration of juveniles for
less serious offenses, such as a 14-year-old having sex with an 11-year-old, the Final Guidelines
deviate from the AWA. In apparent violation of its required mandate to interpret not prescribe
registration standards, the Office of the Attorney General devised a standard considerably less
onerous than that tied to the “aggravated sexual abuse” standard expressly prescribed by the AWA
itself (based on offenses set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2241). Under the Guidelines, registration is required
of individuals age fourteen or over adjudicated delinquent for committing (or attempting or
conspiring to commit) (1) a sexual act with another involving force or threat of force and (2) a sexual
act with another done by rendering the unconscious or drugging the victim. AWA Final Guidelines,
supra note 187, at 16, 63. “Sexual act” includes genital and anal penetration as well as oral-genital
and anal contact. Id. at 16.
262
See id. at 62–91. Perhaps the most vivid example lies in the issue of retroactivity. Giving
short shrift to state objections, the Guidelines maintain their original position, focusing instead on
assertions that the policy is “unfair” or “disagreeable from the standpoint of sex offenders.” Id. at
73–74. The Attorney General obviously felt freedom to deviate from legislative requirements with
juvenile policy, see id., yet to adhere rigidly to an expansive understanding of retroactivity, based on
perceived statutory directive goes unexplained.
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prescribes . . . .”263 With the Final Guidelines in place, states are now expected to
conform to federal will.
One response to the autonomy-stripping concerns noted might be the typical
one offered with respect to conditional spending more generally: that states are not
being forced to adopt federal strictures, but rather willingly and consciously adopt
them, quid pro quo, in return for Byrne Program funds.264 Indeed, to many
commentators, the congressional modus operandi of conditional spending is
respectful of state autonomy interests,265 especially as compared to instances of
exercise of Commerce Clause authority, which entail unalloyed federal
command.266 By using honey rather than vinegar, and in the process liberating
itself from the limits of federal law limiting unfunded mandates,267 and the
attendant criticism typically attending such mandates,268 Congress extends its
policy-making bailiwick beyond that permitted by constitutional text and
tradition.269
263

AWA Final Guidelines, supra note 187, at 75; see also id. at 77 (rejecting view that the
AWA represents “mere advice” to states).
264
See, e.g., Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (“We have repeatedly
characterized…Spending Clause legislation as ‘much in the nature of a contract….’”) (emphasis in
original); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (“[L]egislation enacted
pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
[S]tates agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 480 (1923) (conditional spending “imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which
the State is free to accept or reject”).
265
See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 1010 (1995).
266
With the AWA, it warrants mention, Congress has used a one-two punch, for the first time
using its Commerce Clause authority to make registration failures a federal crime and authorizing the
U.S. Marshals to apprehend violators. As a result, what has heretofore been a violation of state
criminal law, and a matter for state law enforcement, has been channeled into the federal criminal
justice system—if the federal government so wishes. See 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2006). In addition, for
the first time, the AWA made intra-state kidnapping a federal crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000)
(criminalizing kidnapping when the offender makes use of channels or instrumentalities of interstate
commerce).
267
See Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. § 658 (2000) (excluding from
coverage duties that are imposed as a condition of receiving federal assistance); see also PAUL
PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 190 (1995) (noting conditional funding approach takes
Wetterling outside the Act).
268
See Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Service, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1355, 1356
(1993) (noting that “[f]ew contemporary issues concern state and local policymakers as intensely as
unfunded mandates”).
269
See Davis v. Monroe City Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654–55 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that “Congress can use its Spending Clause power to pursue objectives outside
[its delegated powers] by attaching conditions to the grant of federal funds. . . . [T]he Spending
Clause power, if wielded without concern for the federal balance, has the potential to obliterate
distinctions between the national and local spheres of interest and power by permitting the Federal
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Even assuming the principled use of conditional spending, however, the story
of federal intrusion with respect to registration and community notification raises
some troubling issues. The first relates to the political salience of state decisions to
bow to federal will. Ideally, under the quid pro quo scenario of federal conditional
spending, state submission to federal will in return for federal funds permits a clear
inference of state endorsement. With the AWA and its predecessor laws, this
inference is clouded. Because since 1994 submission has been tied to receipt of
Byrne Program funds, an important pool of money used for criminal justice
administration more generally, and not funds allocated specifically for registration
and community notification, accountability and transparency have been
significantly compromised.
Second, serious question exists over the actual voluntariness of state
submission.270 Whereas until the twentieth century conditional spending by the
federal government itself was controversial for its perceived impingement on state
autonomy,271 since then, especially with the advent of federal taxing authority,272
the controversy has cooled and the federal role in state revenues has expanded.273
Government to set policy in the most sensitive areas of traditional state concern, areas which
otherwise would lie outside its reach.”).
270
As Richard Stewart has observed, “‘coerc[ion]’ . . . is an unhelpful anthropomorphism….
The question . . . is not whether federal requirements overbear an hypostasized state ‘free will,’ but
whether they unduly compromise a normative political conception of state autonomy.” Richard B.
Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandatory State Implementation of
National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1254 (1977).
271
See, e.g., CHARLES WARREN, CONGRESS AS SANTA CLAUS OR NATIONAL DONATIONS AND
THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 36–40 (1932) (calling efforts by Congress in
the early-mid 1800s to bestow land upon states in return for internal improvements “attempted
bribery of the States” and behavior that made the “States dependent on Government favor and
subsidy . . . .”); id. at 143 (urging that “[p]ublic opinion must be educated to curb the tendency to
plunge the National Government into action unrelated to its proper National powers.”). See also
DANIEL ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (1962); Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the
Maternity Act, 36 HARV. L. REV. 548 (1922).
Indeed, in ensuing decades debate raged over the authority of Congress to exercise conditional
spending authority, with Alexander Hamilton’s view that federal spending authority is broadly tied to
the matters serving the nation’s “general Welfare” ultimately prevailing over that of James Madison’s
narrower view that spending be limited to implementing one of Congress’s specifically enumerated
powers. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994). Perhaps even more
exasperating to textualists, there is no “Spending Clause” as such, with the conditional spending
authority deriving rather from Art. I, sec. 8 power to spend money for the nation’s “general Welfare.”
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1994).
272
See Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union to National Monolith: Mileposts in the Demise
of American Federalism, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 130–31 (1993) (asserting that the
Sixteenth Amendment, authorizing the federal income tax, afforded Congress the power to “extract[]
money from the now-defenseless states and offer[] to return it with strings attached….”).
273
Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1918 n.24
(1995) (noting that from 1943–1993 federal disbursements to states increased nearly 20,000%).
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In recent decades, states increasingly have come to rely on federal largesse, with
thirty percent of all state budgets deriving from federal sources.274 The Byrne
Formula Grant Program has served as a chief federal funding source of state
criminal justice activities, allocating $5.3 billion from 1994–2004.275
While very recently Byrne funds have been dramatically slashed,276 the
federal “stick” has been highly effective over time.277 Although there has been
some state reluctance to follow federal prescriptions,278 such instances have been
modest and isolated, as manifest in the rapid nationwide adoption of laws in the
mid-1990s. Given the broader needs served by the Byrne funds, and the pressing
fiscal shortfalls now faced by states, such submission should come as no surprise,
especially given the negative political consequences attending failure to secure
“free money” from the federal government.279 In this atmosphere, state officials
have readily succumbed, allowing state criminal justice policy, as one
commentator stated with regard to exercises of Spending Power more generally, to
“tag along after federal money like a hungry dog.”280
274
See Federal Funds Information for States, FFIS: Your State’s Eyes and Ears in Washington,
http://www.ffis.org (last visited April 18, 2008).
275
U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division, Federal Programs Branch, Consolidated
Federal Funds Report—Fiscal Year Multi-Byrne Formula Grant Program, at
http://harvester.census.gov/cffr/asp/Reports.asp (last visited September 7, 2008).
276
In fiscal year 2005, the allocation was $483 million; in 2006, $435.6 million; and in 2007,
$107.7 million. Id.
277
Under South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (citation omitted), federal funding
pressure “might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’” Since
1994, Congress has set the penalty for state noncompliance at 10% of Byrne Program funds, which
compared to the 25% loss initially proposed in Congress, stands little practical chance of prompting
judicial concern. Cf. William Van Alstyne, “Thirty Pieces of Silver” for the Rights of Your People:
Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
303, 319–20 (1993) (“Congress sets the terms of its offers quite knowingly—at just the ‘right’
level—to make them ‘irresistible’ and, accordingly, no state tends very long to resist.”).
278
See supra notes 194–197 and accompanying text.
279
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 876 (1998). Such
eagerness, it bears mention, is especially notable given vigorous state resistance to other recent
federal mandates, such as the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, which conditions state receipt
of federal funds on state educational reforms—also traditionally an area of state prerogative and an
initiative ridiculed as an unfunded federal mandate. See Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political
Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L. REv. 885, 897–900 (2006) (describing state-level opposition
to the NCLBA). With registration and community notification, states have fallen in line much more
readily, indeed expeditiously, even though the adverse federal monetary consequences pale in
comparison. See id. at 904 (noting that the Bush Administration warned that noncompliant states
risked loss of all federal educational funding for disadvantaged students). On state resistance more
generally, see John Dinan, The State of American Federalism 2007–2008: Resurgent State Influence
in the National Policy Process and Continued State Policy Innovation, 38 PUBLIUS 1 (2008).
280
David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 92 (1994). See also Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States’ Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
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This beguilement, however, does more than undermine state autonomy. It has
major practical ramifications for states.281 Ohio is a case in point. Lawmakers in
Columbus, eager to secure “early” compliance bonuses, voted to adopt the AWA,
requiring inter alia disavowal of the state’s risk-based classification regime. They
did so even though the promised federal incentive money was not yet authorized,
and indeed before the Attorney General issued critically important final
guidelines.282 The legislation, which required reclassification of the state’s 25,000
registrants,283 will require hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars to
implement. Under Ohio’s prior law, 77% of registrants were classified in the
state’s least restrictive category—“sexually oriented offender”; under the new
AWA-based regime, 87% have been classified as Tier II (33%) or III (54%), with
their far more onerous requirements and attendant resource demands.284
Commenting on the new in-person registration requirement in particular, a
spokesperson for one county sheriff’s department stated: “It’s a disaster for us . . . I
think many people didn’t think this all the way through.”285
Nor did Congress provide funds to accommodate the broad gamut of related
matters that carry expenses for states, including possible reductions in the number
of guilty pleas (and attendant rise in jury trials) as a result of the harsher, nondiscretionary AWA regime,286 or costs required to handle judicial challenges
prompted by changes in state laws.287 The AWA’s expanded range of registerable
offenses, in turn, will possibly have significant collateral effect in those
jurisdictions that have state (or local) laws restricting where registrants can live,
104, 105 (2001) (“[T]he greatest threat to state autonomy is, and has long been, Congress’s spending
power.”).
281
To date, despite promises by Congress to allocate necessary funds for implementation, very
little money has been provided. In late April 2008, the Department of Justice awarded $11.8 million
in grants, of which $1.8 million was earmarked for tribes. See Department of Justice Announces
$11.8 Million to Help States and Tribal Governments Comply with Adam Walsh Act, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2008/smart08015.htm.
282
See Margo Pierce, Next Comes Burning at the Stake: Is Ohio Getting Too Tough on Sex
Offenders?, CITY BEAT, Aug. 15, 2007, http://citybeat.com/gyrobase/Content?oid=%3A014096.
283
Sharon Coolidge, Sign-in Rules Tougher, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 30, 2007, at 1B.
284
See Doe I v. Dann, No. 1:08 CV 220 (N.D. Ohio June 9, 2008).
285
Rachel Dissell & Gabriel Baird, Ohio’s Tougher Sexual Offender Law Stalls, CLEV. PLAIN
DEALER, Jan. 21, 2008, at A3. In Nevada, which previously had a risk-based system, the number of
Tier III registrants is expected to grow from about 165 to more than 2500. Editorial: Sex Offenders,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 3, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 12574782.
286
States might also face increased costs associated with an enhanced right to jury trials.
While the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial typically only extends to misconduct that results in
six months or more incarceration, the AWA’s more onerous requirements might prompt courts to
extend the right to such situations, which would be of importance because the AWA itself targets
misdemeanants. See State v. Fushek, 183 P.3d 536 (Ariz. 2008).
287
See California Comments, supra note 247 (noting likely challenges based on the more
onerous requirements of the AWA).

2008]

CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEDERALISM

99

exacerbating (from the perspective of law enforcement and registrants at least) an
already vexing problem.288
B. Decentralization
A second way in which federalism values have been trammeled relates to the
tenet that, by circumscribing federal authority, states will be free to enact laws
reflective of local normative preferences,289 and allow for a greater range of
choices for the nation’s residents.290 As the Supreme Court has stated, “the
essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a variety of solutions to
problems and not be forced into a common, uniform mold.”291 With this diversity,
greater aggregate social welfare will ideally ensue, both by virtue of residents
having the capacity to “vote with their feet” when displeased with state
government policy,292 and the creation of conditions permitting a competition
between states and the national government for the peoples’ loyalty on matters of
policy.293
Among the most potent criticisms of the decentralization model is that, at this
point in the nation’s history, American social and political life is homogenized,

288

See Logan, supra note 218.
See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“[Federalism] assures a decentralized
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society . . . .”).
290
Id. (noting that decentralizing function of federalism increases options by “putting the
States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”). As Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have noted,
the value of decentralization is not necessarily synonymous with constitutional federalism. The
former, as they point out, is a “managerial concept” entailing delegation of centralized authority to
subordinate political units, whereas the latter is a “structuring principle for the system as a whole.”
Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 903, 910–11 (1994). In addition, as Frank Cross has observed, decentralization requires that
the subunits be delegated authority by the central unit, a scenario at odds with the U.S. federal system
in which states possess sovereign authority in their own right. Frank B. Cross, The Folly of
Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2002). Decentralization is thus possible absent a
federalist governing structure retaining independent intrinsic value of its own. See Sheryll D. Cashin,
Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 556 (1999).
291
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979). See also Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct.
1029 (2008) (“Nonuniformity is…an unavoidable reality in a federalist system of government.”).
292
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
See also, e.g., Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial
Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75, 150 (2001) (the “imposition of a uniform national solution almost always
will satisfy fewer people” than permitting local variation).
293
See Todd E. Pettys, Our Anti-Competitive Patriotism, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1353, 1358
(2006).
289
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resulting in little meaningful policy variation.294 While in general the point might
be well taken, it is not true with registration and community notification policies.
As is the case with corrections policies more generally, states—at least until the
AWA—have manifested considerable variation with registration and notification.
A significant minority, for instance, have employed risk-based classification
regimes, which not only place premium importance on procedural due process for
individual registrants, but also a risk tolerance: by subjecting fewer individuals to
community notification, they also face false negatives (i.e., individuals not deemed
sufficiently dangerous to warrant notification, but who actually do reoffend). An
even larger minority of states have refused to subject juvenile offenders to
registration and community notification or otherwise placed limits on the extent
and duration of their eligibility.295
This variation, at first blush, would not appear to jeopardize a diversity
interest, at least not one deserving attention. After all, policy variation in the
community control of sex offenders is a far cry from that usually in mind when
decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition are discussed, such as that
relating to tax or educational policy. While the significant transaction costs
associated with changing state residences might outweigh the perceived benefits to
be achieved relative to the latter policies, sufficient to chill migration,296 variations
in state registration and community notification regimes plausibly do not. This is
so when one considers the perspectives of two key groups: community members
and registrants themselves.
Community members, the primary intended beneficiaries of registration and
notification laws, presumably are cognizant of the approaches taken by their state
legislatures. Because any deficiencies would harm them, and not residents of other
states, the resulting situation would inspire residents to either pressure policy
changes in their states or exercise their exit rights. From the perspective of
Congress, however, states (and their residents) should not be free to maintain such
a system, a view that betrays the traditional understanding that state heterogeneity,
despite its challenges, actually constitutes a benefit of the nation’s decentralized
governing structure.297 Of course, one person’s “patch-work” is another’s

294

See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Puppy Federalism and the Blessings of America, 574 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 37, 46 (2001); Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within:
Seeking Checks and Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 615 (2007).
295
See Elizabeth Garfinkle, Comment, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex
Offender Community Notification Laws in America, 91 CAL. L. REV. 163 (2003).
296
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE 183 (1998); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 387–88
(1997).
297
See Lynn A. Baker & Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should
Abandon its Spending Doctrine, and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke it to Do So, 78 IND.
L.J. 459, 477–83 (2003).
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“diversity,”298 yet whether a criminal justice policy choice is wise on its merits has
heretofore not been a legitimate basis to justify federal intrusion on state authority.
State policies have not endured merely as a result of federal political sufferance.299
With respect to registrants, the social value would appear attenuated at best.
Why should we care in the least about ex-offenders, especially those convicted of
an offense warranting registration? One need not be a bleeding-heart civil
libertarian to answer. This is because of the wide swath of criminal misconduct
that registration laws have often targeted, including, until Lawrence v. Texas,
consensual adult sodomy.300 Such normative preferences were permissible;
individuals not wishing to be targeted could move. With the AWA, and its
broadened range of registerable offenses (including misdemeanors), however, such
breadth will be the national norm, and juveniles will also be forced to register. As
the reach of registration has grown—thanks in significant part to federal
demands—the freedom-preserving benefits of decentralized governance have been
diminished.301 This evolution has not only negatively impinged individual liberty;
it has also limited the competitive capacity of states, which, as is their right, might
wish to adopt a less inclusive approach in the interest of attracting beneficial
human and social capital.302

298

As Lynn Baker has observed, “[t]he freedom of sub-national political communities to
choose…, like any other form of ‘diversity,’ predictably results in a mixed bag of results.” Lynn A.
Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 448 (2002).
299
See William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty, Federalism and National Criminal Law:
Modernist Constitutional Doctrine and the Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1737, 1740 (1988) (constitutional federalism, marked by structural limits on Congress, has been
replaced by “political sufferance federalism”: “it is for Congress to decide to what extent it desires to
make national law . . . . Congress decides what in its view warrants national, uniform control.”).
300
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (noting that at least four states made
consensual sodomy a registerable offense). Other examples of excessive registration requirements
abound, including that of Alabama, which requires registration when one is convicted of posting an
obscene bumper sticker. See Ala. Stat. § 13A-12-131 (2005). See also Human Rights Watch, No
Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the US 39–40 (2007), available at
http://hrw.org/reports/2007/us0907web.pdf (noting inter alia that at least 5 states require registration
for adult-prostitution-related offenses and at least 13 states require registration for public urination).
301
As Seth Kreimer has noted, the “variation between states is desirable because it provides an
opportunity for individual citizens to mold identities and choose their futures, and because an open
national community follows from this right to experimentation . . . . Federalism preserves freedom in
part by the constitutionally protected character of emigration rights . . . . [E]ach citizen may take
advantage of the liberties offered by any state.” Seth F. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance
of Borders in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 973, 981–82 (2002).
302
See Wayne A. Logan, Horizontal Federalism in an Age of Criminal Justice
Interconnectedness, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 257, 326 (2005). For instance, a family with a juvenile
household member, or an individual convicted of possessing child pornography, both within the
ambit of the AWA, would be unable to affirmatively choose residence in another state based on its
eschewal of the requirements.
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C. Experimentation
Finally, and related, federal intrusion has undercut the prospects for state
experimentation, consistent with Justice Brandeis’s famous ideal.303 Criminal
justice policy, especially relative to corrections, has been a fertile field for
experimentation and development, leading to policy diffusion.304
Such
experimentation has certainly marked registration and community notification.
Indeed, registration itself originated first in localities (in the Los Angeles area, in
the early 1930s) and later was embraced by the states (with California adopting the
first state-wide registration law, in 1947). Likewise, notification originated in
Washington State (in 1990), and like registration, has constantly evolved. Most
recently, states have been engaged in public debate over whether a conviction or
risk-based registration classification scheme is preferable.305 The policy debate
was perhaps most visible in Maine, where residents and lawmakers in 2006 were
engaged in heated discussion over continued use of the state’s conviction-based
Internet registry after the vigilante killing of two registrants, one of whom had
been convicted of “Romeo and Juliet” underage sexual misconduct.306 Similar
debates have ensued over the appropriateness of requiring adjudicated juveniles to
register and be subject to community notification.307

303

See New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(asserting that individual states can serve as “laborator[ies]” and undertake “experiments without risk
to the rest of the country”); see also Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (the nation’s “federalist structure of
joint sovereigns . . . allows for more innovation and experimentation in government”).
304
See Sara Sun Beale, Reporter’s Draft for the Working Group on Principles to Use When
Considering the Federalization of Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1277, 1295 (1995) (noting that
“[m]any of the most promising trends in criminal law enforcement began at the state and local level,
including specialized drug courts, community policing . . . and sentencing guidelines”).
It is also worth mentioning that such reforms are not susceptible of the influential critique of
Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman that states cannot be counted on to be engines of experimentation
because they fear that other jurisdictions will “steal” their ideas. Under this view, states will
naturally free-ride on the innovations of others, and so too will risk-averse incumbent political actors
who have little incentive to experiment and hence risk electoral punishment. Under such
circumstances, a collective action problem arises ripe for intervention by another actor, such as the
federal government. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and ReElection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980). With criminal justice, unlike areas such as
corporate law, states are not motivated to entice businesses with corresponding negative
consequences for other states, providing an incentive to poach attractive policies.
305
For discussion of the relative merits of the two approaches, see Wayne A. Logan, Sex
Offender Registration and Community Notification Policy: Past, Present, and Future, 34 NEW ENG. J.
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 3, 13–14 (2008).
306
See David Hench, Panel to Consider Adding Details to Sex Offender List, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, July 23, 2006, at A1.
307
See, e.g., 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 1, 2007, available at
http://www.ilga.gov/senate/transcripts/strans95/09500033.pdf (Illinois Senate floor debate).
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Federal intrusion has quelled this discussion, disrupting what has been an
ongoing natural experiment. With Wetterling, in 1994, the states were pressured to
adopt registration laws, and with Megan’s Law in 1996, community notification.
As a result, with possible control states (those without laws) taken out of the
equation, basic research into the efficacy of the two social control strategies was
precluded. Nevertheless, because federal law served as a comparatively modest
and flexible “floor” for states, leaving them free to reach independent
determinations, the opportunity for comparative empirical work on the particulars
of the laws existed.308
With the AWA’s enactment in 2006, the prospects for experimentation have
been greatly diminished. States are obliged to adopt federal requirements of a
significantly broadened cast, including the scope of registration eligibility,
increased durations of coverage, in-person verification, registration of juveniles
and retroactive application, complemented by a conviction-based classification
scheme.309 This even though Congress contemporaneously directed (for the first
time) that empirical evaluation be undertaken on the relative efficacy of the
competing classification regimes and the effectiveness of registration and
notification more generally,310 which itself sharply undercuts confidence in any
assertion that the AWA’s expansive set of prescriptions is optimal and warrants
nationwide application.
D. Whither (Better Yet: Wither) Federalism?
Despite the foregoing federalism-based concerns, the extended federal
intrusion has inspired little resistance. In Congress, the most common ardent
supporters of states’ rights—conservative Republicans—have remained silent.311
308

Alas, however, meaningful work never came to pass. How and why a social experiment of
such a magnitude avoided empirical evaluation remains one of the most curious aspects of the history
of registration and notification. For discussion of why this likely occurred, see LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE
AS POWER, supra note 7, chs. 4 & 7.
309
See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Federalism for the Future, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 525 (2001)
(“The debate . . . is likely to be a much less informed one if federal rules replace the different state
experiments.”).
310
42 U.S.C. §§ 16990–16991 (2006).
311
As noted by Professor Kadish, the incongruity is not unusual for federal criminal justice
initiatives. “It is curious . . . that crime is the one area of traditional state and local concern where
even strongly federally oriented politicians often support national intervention . . . . In [the areas of
health care or welfare] the same politicians pushing for increased federal criminal legislation turn into
ardent federalists.” Sanford H. Kadish, The Folly of Overfederalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1247,
1247 (1995). Nor need one need look far for examples of other inconsistencies, including the zealous
efforts of Republican lawmakers to trump decisions by sovereign state courts in Florida in their
efforts to super-impose federal will in the Terry Schiavo case. See John Dinan & Dale Krane, The
State of American Federalism, 2005: Federalism Resurfaces in the Political Debate, 36 PUBLIUS 327
(2006).
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To the extent federalism objections were voiced, they came from liberal
Democrats.312 In 1994, for instance, Representative Jerry Nadler (D-NY)
repeatedly spoke out on the federalism implications of the proposed Wetterling
Act:
What we are attempting to do here . . . is to mandate the States to enact a
State criminal law and a State criminal [law] program . . . . We are
mandating the States under threat of withholding Federal funds as to a
criminal law they are to enact. The Federal Government should not be in
the business generally of enacting and writing local State criminal laws.
That is the business of the State. The State legislature has ample policy
arguments on both sides.313
...
When I hear [a colleague] stand up here and say that it is all of our
responsibility, sure, it is all of our responsibility, but in this country we
leave general decisions of criminal law generally to the States . . . . In
fact, . . . we are saying to the State, “If you do not do it exactly the way
we tell you to do it, then we are going to take Federal funds away from
you and we are going to mandate it . . . .” This is telling the States, “We
know how best to do it, we are telling you how to do it in the States,” and
that is not something we ought to be doing in the criminal law . . . ,
especially when there are strong policy arguments that this particular
Of course, Democrats also show a circumstantial featly to federalism. Indeed, the very same
month that President Clinton endorsed Megan’s Law, he vetoed the “Common Sense Product
Liability Reform Act,” which was motivated by concern over state law variations and damage
awards, publicly stating that the bill would “inappropriately intrude[] on state authority.” Neil A.
Lewis, President Vetoes Limits on Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at A1. See also Jonathan R.
Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a
Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 265 (1990) (noting that
“[c]onservatives and liberals alike extol the virtues of state autonomy whenever deference to the
states happens to serve their political needs at a particular moment”).
312
Conservatives did raise federalism-based concern in one instance. The issue arose in 1997
in the context of an effort to strengthen registration provisions, and centered on the decision of at
least four states to require registration of adults convicted of consensual sodomy. In response,
Representative Chuck Schumer (D-NY), a strong supporter of federal registration laws, offered an
amendment before the House Judiciary Committee that such states would be disqualified from
receiving federal funds. The amendment was defeated on the rationale that it would intrude on the
policy making authority of states. Dissenting members of the House Judiciary Committee, all
Democrats, called the federalism argument “specious,” noting that the proposed legislation already
“impose[d] a multitude of requirements on states.” Comm. on the Judiciary Report, Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offenders Registration Improvements Act of 1997,
H.R. Rep. No. 105-256 at 41–42 (1997).
313
140 CONG. REC. H5612, 5613 (daily ed. July 13, 1994) (statement of Rep. Nadler).
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solution to this problem has real problems with it. Let the State
legislature deal with the specifics of how to deal with this.314
Similarly, in 1996, Representative Mel Watt (D-NC), while initially inclined
to remain silent due to the “difficulty of the issue,” ultimately exhorted his
colleagues to “stand up for the Constitution and stand up for States[’] rights” and
oppose [the federal Megan’s Law].315 Watt stated that “in this area, somehow or
another we cannot seem to justify allowing states to make their own decisions . . . .
All of a sudden Big Brother Government must direct the states to do something
that is not even necessarily a Federal issue.”316 As with Nadler in 1994, however,
Watt’s sentiment was forlorn and the legislation was passed with overwhelming
support (including, ultimately, the affirmative vote of Watt himself)317 and signed
by President Clinton in a moving Rose Garden ceremony in which the President,
with Maureen Kanka at his side, endorsed a nationalization theme: “Today
America warns: If you dare to prey on our children, the law will follow you
wherever you go. State to State, town to town. . . . Today, America circles the
wagon[s] around our children.”318
A similar reticence marked evolution of the AWA. While federalism concern
was expressly voiced by outside parties in a handful of letters made a part of the
House Record,319 such concern was only indirectly raised on the floor, with
witnesses and representatives alike downplaying any effect, itself trumped by the
avowed need for national intervention.320 In the Senate, Senator Patrick Leahy (DVT) expressed concern over the AWA’s required registration of juveniles but
314

Id. at H5616.
140 CONG. REC. H4451, 4456 (daily ed. May 7, 1996) (statement of Rep. Watt).
316
Id.
317
See supra note 115 and accompanying text. The House Report, containing “additional
views,” also omitted any express concern over federalism. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-555 (1996); Pub.
L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996).
318
Remarks on Signing Megan’s Law and an Exchange with Reporters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 763–
764 (1996).
319
See 152 CONG. REC. H690 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of the American Civil
Liberties Union); H.R. REP. NO. 218, pt. 1, at 285 (2005); 152 CONG. REC. H687-89 (daily ed. Mar. 8,
2006) (statement of Michael Z. Buncher, Deputy Public Defender, New Jersey); 152 CONG. REC.
H686 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary, Judicial Conference
of the United States).
320
See House Bills on Sexual Crimes Against Children: Hearing on H.R. 764, H.R. 95, H.R.
1355, H.R. 1505, H.R. 2423, H.R. 244, H.R. 2796, and H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 26 (2005)
(statements of Rep. Gohmert and Rep. Poe); Id. at 30 (statement of Rep. Brown-Waite); Protecting
Our Nation’s Children from Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals: What Needs to be Done?
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 33 (2005) (statement of Tracy A. Henke, Deputy Associate Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice).
315
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ultimately concluded that the bill struck “an acceptable balance” and vaguely
related that he was “glad that those of us who were concerned about appropriate
deference to the expertise of the States spoke out and were heard to some
extent.”321 Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) expressed the sole other concern,
again indirectly, by lauding what he termed the “compromise” allowing states with
a risk-based regime (such as his home state of Massachusetts), which he
characterized as “go[ing] beyond” the “basic requirements” of the AWA “by
providing individualized risk assessments of each sex offender who goes on the
registry.” By “compromise” the senator referred to the AWA provision noted
above that possibly allows deviation from the AWA’s regime in the event a state’s
highest court finds that such deviation is constitutionally compelled, such as has
been the case with the evolution of the risk-based regime in Massachusetts.322
Massachusetts, Kennedy stated,
has been vigilant in implementing a comprehensive and effective sex
offender registry, and it should not lose much needed Federal funding
where there is a demonstrated inability to comply with . . . this new
Federal law.
No state should be penalized and lose critical Federal funding for law
enforcement programs as long as reasonable efforts are under way to
implement procedures consistent with the purposes of the act. It is
essential that the Federal Government continue to collaborate and to
provide support for State and local governments . . . .323
Time will tell whether the “compromise” Senator Kennedy alluded to, which
he termed “very important,” will protect the autonomy of jurisdictions such as
Massachusetts. However, as noted above, requiring states to achieve “substantial
implementation” of and “compliance” with a federal directive, calling any barrier a
state constitutional “problem,” and requiring a state to “consult” with the U.S.,
hardly manifests much fealty to federalism.324 Moreover, even if Senator
Kennedy’s faith in the deferential capacity of the Attorney General to broker a
state constitutional compromise is ultimately warranted, the litany of conflicting
state statutes, rules, and policies, themselves not constitutionally commanded, will
be accorded no deference.
321

152 CONG. REC. S8012, S8027 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
Id. at S8023 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (“Each State will face
challenges in the implementation of these new Federal requirements, and States should not be
penalized if exact compliance with the [AWA’s] requirements would place the State in violation of
its constitution or an interpretation of the State’s constitution by its highest court.”).
323
Id.
324
See supra notes 232–235 and accompanying text.
322
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To students of state-federal relations, the foregoing account should come as
no surprise. In contemporary times, in contrast to the past,325 federalism has
decidedly ranked as a second-order concern,326 with preferred substantive
policies—certainly relative to criminal justice—reigning supreme.327 With
registration and notification in particular, federal actors have been allured by
enormous political benefits and faced no political risk. Moreover, there has been
scant push-back from the states. Wary of being tagged as “soft” on sex offenders
or being an obstacle to the securing of “free” federal money, state legislators have
readily fallen in line.328
In assessing this political dynamic, it is important to note that public discourse
has never been meaningfully affected by the federalism implications of federal
mandates. If the terms of the debate were to be recast, if federalism were to figure
meaningfully in the political discourse, the outcome might well have been
different.329 As has been observed with opinion surveys seeking to plumb public
sentiment, including the death penalty,330 it very much matters how a public policy
matter is couched. If federalism was salient in debate over enactment of
registration and community notification laws, then resistance from state residents
might filter up to federal law-makers, as Herbert Wechsler’s political safeguards

325
See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text. Such concern, it should be recognized, was
not uniform. That this was so was evidenced by Representative Thetus Sims (D-TN), who in 1910
inveighed against what he saw as undue federalism concern prompted by the Mann Act, which
eventually passed by voice vote: “how any man can haggle or higgle over a constitutional provision”
in the face of “white slave” traffic “is more than I can [imagine].” 45 CONG. REC. 811 (1910).
326
See generally Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 131,
131–37 (2004).
327
See William P. Marshall, Federalization: A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719,
724 (1995) (“It may win votes . . . to claim that one is in favor of returning power to the state—it is
seldom a vote winner to assert that one is not going to vote for a popular criminal measure on the
grounds that it conflicts with a theoretical vision of federalism.”).
328
The reaction parallels the behavior of states more generally down the years when the
federal government enacts criminal laws permitting concurrent jurisdiction (e.g., drug or firearm
offenses) and states mount little resistance. See Richman, supra note 39, at 404–05. But as noted at
the outset, such silence might be in large part explained by the reality that with concurrent
federalization states benefit from the U.S. handling a part (albeit small) of their workloads. Here,
federal action only serves to increase the burden on states.
329
Standing up for federalism potentially raises a complicated question for federal legislators,
especially liberals, given the doctrine’s historic deployment by opponents of civil rights and New
Deal-era initiatives. Rory K. Little, Myths and Principles of Federalization, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1029,
1065 (1995). However, it is important to recognize that states’ rights swing both ways. See Lynn A.
Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433, 448 (2002) (noting that the
doctrine has been invoked to preserve racial hegemony (e.g., resisting federal anti-lynching laws) and
to preserve individual liberty (e.g., resisting federal laws condoning or facilitating slavery)).
330
See Wayne A. Logan, Casting New Light on an Old Subject: Death Penalty Abolitionism
for a New Millennium, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1336, 1370 (2002).
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model would dictate.331 Support for this possibility lies in surveys showing that
citizen opinions on preferred allocation of governmental authority varies in accord
with policy area, with criminal justice decidedly being within the ambit of state
(and local) government.332 As Cindy Kam and Robert Mikos observe, “by
exposing the public to federalism appeals . . . , elite debate can make federalism a
more salient consideration in the minds of citizens.”333 However, such attention
(from state and federal lawmakers alike) has not been in evidence with registration
and community notification, removing what might be a hedge against federal
intrusion.
IV. NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY
The preceding discussion highlighted basic doctrinal objections to federal
intrusion. Yet such objections arguably only go so far, as critics of “abstract”334 or
“puppy”335 federalism are wont to assert. Importantly, in themselves they do not
resolve the question of whether national criminal justice policy, deriving from the
federal legislative process, is predisposed to being inferior to that deriving from
states. Nor, presuming the epistemic appeal of a federal policy-making role, does
the foregoing determine what form such a policy should take. This Part first
considers whether the federal law-making process is well-suited to the task of
enlightened criminal justice policy creation, using the history of registration and
community notification as a case study. Later, assuming suitability of a federal
role, discussion turns to the question of what form federal policy should assume.
A. The U.S. as a Central Planner
Historically, federal involvement in policy-making has been thought to have
several benefits. Most significant, the national legislative process itself has been
regarded as superior because it is executed, in James Madison’s words, by leaders
more likely to have “enlightened views and virtuous sentiments [that] render them

331

See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
332
See PHILLIP W. ROEDER, PUBLIC OPINION AND POLICY LEADERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN
STATES 99, 116, 203 (1994).
333
Robert A. Mikos, The Populist Safeguards of Federalism, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1669, 1715
(2007).
334
See, e.g., Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 695 (2008).
335
See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 294. But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
157 (1992) (stating that deference to federalism is warranted “even if one could prove that [it]
secured no advantages to anyone”).
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superior to local prejudices and to schemes of injustice[.]”336 The federal process,
it is said, can “readily gather facts from across the Nation, assess the magnitude of
a problem, and more easily find an appropriate remedy.”337 In devising policy
outcomes, it can also utilize subcommittees with special expertise on particular
issues, augmented by access to superior resources for research and analysis.338 As
a result of these features, the federal policy-making apparatus can be expected to
achieve optimized policy outcomes.
Little evidence exists, however, that this idealized scenario reflects reality.
Congress, it is widely acknowledged, often suffers from dysfunctional paralysis, so
much so that states have taken the lead in numerous areas of national significance,
including environmental protection, immigration, health care, and welfare
reform.339 Worse yet, when Congress does act, the prevailing institutional
dynamic is such that it fails to inspire optimism, with the non-deliberative methods
characteristic of more recent Congresses,340 aversion for expert input,341 and undue
interest group influence342 raising particular concern.
Congressional dysfunction is especially evident with criminal justice policy.
As Rachel Barkow has observed, when it comes to criminal justice Congress is
predisposed to enact laws of “the ‘feel-good, do-something’ variety rather than to
seek out the most cost-effective way to address a particular problem.”343 One need
336
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83–84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
Hamilton contended that while initially individuals would repose greater trust in their state leaders,
this would change over time if the federal government excelled and the states faltered. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 17, supra at 1199 (Alexander Hamilton).
337
Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
338
See Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L.
REV. 199, 209 (1971); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review: A
Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1179 (2001).
339
This is not to say, of course, that vertical (state-federal) policy diffusion does not occur in
the reverse, with the federal government at times acting in an agenda-setting capacity by highlighting
the need to act on issues and inspiring states to pursue innovations considered but not acted upon by
Congress. For discussion of several such instances since the 1980s (e.g., medical savings accounts
after Congress failed to enact the Health Security Act), see ANDREW KARCH, DEMOCRATIC
LABORATORIES: POLICY DIFFUSION AMONG THE AMERICAN STATES 67–103 (2007).
340
See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS (3d ed. 2007).
341
See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from
Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525 (2005).
342
See J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Timing and Form of Federal Regulation: The Case of
Climate Change, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1499, 1539–40 (2007).
343
Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276,
1303 (2005). See also David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington,
28 CRIME & JUST. 71, 121–22 (2001) (observing that the political symbolism of crime “is much easier
when it is disconnected from the reality of managing scarce resources”). As Professor Barkow has
observed elsewhere:
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look far for support for these assertions, including the ongoing federal proclivity
for get-tough policies resulting in mass incarceration,344 which stand in stark
contrast to state efforts to scale back use of harsh mandatory minimums, enhance
use of community corrections, and pursue evidence-based programmatic efforts
intended to lower recidivism and enhance public safety.345 “When severity is
politically costless,” as it is for Congress, as William Stuntz has observed, “one
can expect to see severe laws.”346
This orientation, in turn, is affected by a variety of factors that distinguish
criminal justice from other policy areas. Notably, unlike other areas attracting the
attention of Congress, criminal justice is often driven and justified by “common
sense,” which can moot any possible perceived need for expert input. Moreover,
unlike other areas in which Congress often seeks to intrude on state prerogative—
such as securities or environmental regulation, products liability, or electronic
identity theft—the impetus for change does not come from politically powerful
private sector entities, themselves often opposed by public interest groups.347
Groups representing the interests of defendants are politically weak at all levels of
government, but it is more likely that advocates making arguments for shorter sentences
on the basis of cost concerns will have more sway at the state level. States are more
sensitive to sentencing costs because . . . states cannot carry deficits to pay for their crime
policies. As a result, state actors tend to see the budget in zero-sum terms, and crime
expenditures are viewed with greater scrutiny because money saved on incarceration
costs could be spent elsewhere.
Rachel E. Barkow, The Political Market for Criminal Justice, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1713, 1721 (2006).
See also Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags
to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 774–75 (2005) (noting comparative absence of fiscal
constraint operative on Congress).
344
While state prison populations increased 300% from 1980–2001, the growth in federal
prison populations was 600%. Paige M. Harrison & Allen J. Beck, Prisoners in 2001, (U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Wash., D.C.) BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. BULL., July 2002, available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p01.pdf.
345
See generally ALISON LAWRENCE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS LEGISLATION: 2007 ACTION, 2008 OUTLOOK (Jan. 2008), available at
http://www.ncsl.org/print/cj/07sentencingreport.pdf.
346
William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780,
806 (2006).
347
See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 19–20 (2007). As Professor Hills notes, state
laws “are an important influence on Congress’s agenda. They spur interest groups to raise issues that
might otherwise never receive congressional attention.” Id. at 20. For instance, the “patchwork” of
more stringent (not lax, as with the AWA) state laws relating to health, safety and environmental
concerns have prompted industry to seek uniform (and less onerous) standards in Congress. See Eric
Lipton & Gardiner Harris, In Turnaround, Industries Seek U.S. Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
2007 at A1. For discussion of why interest groups are especially predisposed to seek out national
legislative solutions, as opposed to those at the state level, see Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference
to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation
of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271–73 (1990).
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Rather, policy entrepreneurs348 are very often members of Congress who stand to
gain substantial political benefit and face little organized opposition.349
The history of federal registration and community notification laws provides a
compelling case study of these tendencies. Congress, in tandem with election
cycles,350 has created and imposed from on-high policies that it knows will not
have significant impact on the federal criminal justice system.351 Unlike even the
federalization of crime, where federal resources (however modest) must be
dedicated to enforcement, the burdens and costs of registration and notification fall
squarely on the states,352 without need for significant additional budgetary
allocations from Congress (other than that already allocated under the Byrne
Program).353 So liberated, members of Congress adopt whatever policies they
desire, secure in the knowledge of the major political benefits of backing laws that
are not only tough on despised sex offenders,354 but that also exalt the memory of
highly sympathetic individual victims such as Jacob Wetterling, Megan Kanka,
and Adam Walsh.355
348

On the role of such agents in the federal legislative process more generally, see MARK
SCHNEIDER ET AL., PUBLIC ENTREPRENEURS: AGENTS FOR CHANGE IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1995).
349
See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 729 (2005) (noting
that “unlike most areas of regulation, criminal law features pro-regulatory forces that are strong and
unified and face little coordinated opposition”).
350
On this tendency more generally, see ANTHONY KING, RUNNING SCARED: WHY AMERICA’S
POLITICIANS CAMPAIGN TOO MUCH AND GOVERN TOO LITTLE 154 tbl.3 (1997).
351
Indeed, even individuals convicted of federal crimes will not be subject to federal
registration, but rather will be the responsibility of the state registration systems. See AWA Final
Guidelines, supra note 187, at 47.
352
The AWA provision permitting federal prosecution of interstate registration violations is an
exception. It is highly unlikely, however, that many federal prosecutions will be mounted. Even if of
mainly symbolic importance, the federal failure-to-register provision sends an important message:
that the states cannot handle registration violations themselves and that the federal government must
come to the rescue. See Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration: Federal Prosecution, NAT’L
L.J., Mar. 5, 2007, at 23.
353
See supra note 281 (discussing modest grants for implementing AWA thus far announced
by the Department of Justice).
354
See Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CONN. L. REV. 319, 323–25 (2003) (noting strong
political appeal of anti-sex offender laws).
355
The AWA marks the zenith of this personalization. Not only is the AWA named after a
victim but it also enshrines the names of 17 other victims in its “declaration of purpose,” along with
their brief personal descriptions and the accounts of their victimizations. The law was enacted “to
protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children, and in response to the vicious
attacks by violent predators against the victims . . . ” specified. 42 U.S.C. § 16901 (2006).
Furthermore, personalization is reflected in particular parts of the AWA itself. Seemingly wary of in
any way besmirching the memory of prior namesakes, Congress established as a constituent part of
the AWA “the Jacob Wetterling, Megan Nicole Kanka, and Pam Lychner Sex Offender Registration
and Community Notification Program,” victims already named in the list of seventeen. 42 U.S.C. §
16902 (2006).
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The legislative process leading to passage of the laws has been symptomatic
of the aforementioned impoverishment, with the evolution of the Adam Walsh Act
AWA again serving as a telling example. Although several years in the making,
the AWA derived from a troubling fast-track modus operandi. The originating
legislation (H.R. 3132) passed on September 14, 2005, by voice vote, and six
months later the bill was again before the House, this time minus Democrat
sponsored amendments targeting hate crimes and a provision banning the sale of
firearms to persons convicted of sex crimes. Shepherded by the Republican
leadership through the House under suspension of the rules without debate,
apparently due to concerns over the amendments, the new bill (H.R. 4472) again
passed by voice vote on March 8, 2006.356 The summary process, following a
similarly truncated consideration of Megan’s Law a decade earlier,357 prompted the
following statement from Representative John Conyers (D-MI):
I rise in strong opposition to this legislation and the manner by which it
comes before us today. [T]his legislation, all 164 pages, has managed to
completely circumvent the traditional legislative process.
Without the benefit of a single hearing or committee markup, the
legislation has somehow found its way here to the floor of the House of
Representatives. To make matters worse, it’s being considered under
suspension of the rules, leaving [members] with reasonable concerns no
opportunity to offer modest amendments . . . .
After criticizing the omission of the hate crimes and the firearms ban
provisions, Representative Conyers spoke directly to the lack of scrutiny
associated with the bill’s adoption of a conviction-based classification scheme:
[T]he measure under consideration today includes a complex system of
categories whereby sex offenders are classified based upon the nature of
their offense. They are also routinely forced to verify the accuracy of
their registry information based upon this system.
This new system of registration and registry verification has never been
discussed by members of [the House Judiciary] [C]ommittee. While
some may certainly welcome such a system, others most likely will not.

356

Seth Stern, House Moves on Anti-Crime Package, CONG. Q. WEEKLY, Mar. 13, 2006, at

709.
357
See 142 CONG. REC. H11,049, H11,133 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Watt)
(noting that the bill was not subject to House Judiciary Committee consideration).
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In either event, a change of this magnitude should not be undertaken
without adequate thought, consideration and debate.358
Attention then shifted to the Senate, which on May 4, 2006, adopted a
markedly different approach, including, inter alia, a provision affording states
significant latitude in registrant classification decisions and excluding juveniles
from registration and community notification.359
Two months later, what came to be the AWA emerged for vote, with the
conviction-based regime and other trappings of the original House bill (including
the required registration of juveniles) intact. With the only mention of the
inscrutable process coming from Senator Kennedy (D-MA), who adverted to
“difficult compromises” that had to be made,360 the bill passed in both the Senate
(July 20) and House (July 25) by voice vote.
The AWA’s passage also affords a compelling example of congressional
disinterest in expert input. Emblematic of this, in June 2005, a key formative
phase of the AWA, the House Judiciary Committee received testimony from:
• Representatives Foley (R-FL), Poe (R-TX), Brown-Waite (R-FL),
and Pomeroy (D-ND);
• Tracy Henke (Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department of
Justice);
• Laura Parsky (Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S.
Department of Justice);
• Charlie Crist (Attorney General of Florida);
• Ernie Allen (President and CEO, National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children);
• Amie Zyla (a child victim of sexual assault);
• Carol Fornoff (mother of a murdered child);
• John Rhodes (Assistant Federal Public Defender, Montana); and
• Fred Berlin (Associate Professor, Psychiatry, Johns Hopkins
University School of Medicine).361

358

152 CONG. REC. H677 (daily ed. March 8, 2006) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
152 CONG. REC. S4079 (daily ed. May 4, 2006). With respect to classification, the bill
provided that “[t]he tier designation of an individual shall be determined under criteria promulgated
by the participating State in accordance with the participating State’s resources and local priorities.”
Id. at S4086.
360
152 CONG. REC. 8022 (daily ed. July 20, 2006) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
361
Also, the House Record for March 8, 2006, contains letters with critical analysis of various
provisions of the House legislation from the Association for the Treatment of Sex Offenders; State of
New Jersey, Office of the Public Defender; the American Civil Liberties Union; and Human Rights
Watch. See 152 CONG. REC. H657, 687–691 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006).
359
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Other than Dr. Berlin, no individual offered critical analysis of registration or
community notification in general362 or the provisions of the proposed legislation
in particular,363 and Berlin was subjected to extended political monologs and few
substantive questions. Witness Foley, a co-sponsor of the bill, and chair of the
“Congressional Missing and Exploited Children’s Caucus,” who himself was later
forced to resign due to his misbehavior with adolescent male staffers, mistakenly
intoned that only “most states have some form of registry”364 (when of course all
states do).
Perhaps more important, so far as the formal record reveals, other than Florida
Attorney General Crist, an advocate of the bill, no input was sought from or
provided by state and local authorities, who not only would be tasked with
implementing the new registration and community notification policies, but also
have extensive experience with the challenges posed by registration and
notification. The central feature of the AWA’s regime, the conviction-based
classification approach, closely resembles the approach of Delaware, one of the
nation’s smallest states (home to Joseph Biden, a co-sponsor of the AWA). Even
more remarkable, is the decision of Congress to impose uniform registration and
community notification requirements, despite not only the ongoing lack of
empirical evidence of the public safety benefits of registration and notification
more generally, but also the specific requirements mandated (e.g., conviction based
approach, frequent in-person verification, and targeting juveniles).365
362
See Protecting Our Nation’s Children from Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals: What
Needs to be Done? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 22 (2005) (statement of Fred Berlin, M.D., Associate
Professor, Johns Hopkins University) (noting that “the verdict is not yet in on whether [community
notification] is proving to be successful” and expressing concern that it merely encourages registrants
to commit crimes in communities where they are not known; identifying need for research into
whether community notification will drive registrants “underground”; and that community
notification might identify incest victims and perhaps discourage reporting of incest).
363
Federal Defender Rhodes did raise significant questions over the bill’s proposed
significantly enhanced penalties for federal sex offenses, which he condemned for having adverse
impact on those committing crimes on Indian reservations. See Protection Against Sexual
Exploitation of Children Act of 2005, and the Prevention and Deterrence of Crimes Against Children
Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 2318 and H.R. 2388 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 38 (2005) (statement of John
Rhodes, Assistant Federal Defender, Montana).
364
House Bills on Sexual Crimes Against Children: Hearing on H.R. 764, H.R. 95, H.R. 1355,
H.R. 1505, H.R. 2423, H.R. 244, H.R. 2796, and H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 6 (2005)
(statement of Rep. Foley). A similar lack of basic familiarity was evidenced in the statement of
Representative James Gillmor (R-VA), who offered that “[c]urrently, each state classifies offenders
differently according to the risk they pose to the community,” when of course most states do not use
individualized risk determinations at all. 152 Cong. Rec. H680 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2006) (statement of
Rep. Gillmor).
365
Notably, the only evidence of Congress’s willingness to consult states came after the fact,
with its directive to the Attorney General to conduct future studies on the comparative benefits of risk
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Finally, the above-described legislative deficiencies were in no sense
ameliorated by the involvement of the executive branch. While of late,
commentators have argued in favor of the redemptive benefit of executive rulemaking, asserting, inter alia, its utility in mitigating common public choice and
federalism deficiencies of Congress,366 the executive’s role in refining the AWA
cannot be counted among such successes.367 As noted above, the Attorney
General’s efforts have been marked by a steadfast insularity from state and expert
input, delay, and disregard for federalism concerns.368
The point of the foregoing is not to say that state legislative consideration of
registration and community notification has always been superior. State laws, too,
have often been fast-tracked and devoid of expert input.369 Nor is it accurate to say
that state registration and community notification laws are as a rule more measured
or enlightened than those emanating from Congress.370
Important differences do exist, however, perhaps explaining to some degree
the quality of federal law. In states, at least some nominal resistance has
manifested, i.e., an actual “debate” has occurred. Such was the case in Minnesota,
for instance, the home of Jacob Wetterling, the location of the influential
and conviction-based classification methods. The Attorney General is to assemble a task force
consisting of persons who “represent national, State, and local interests” and possess expertise in
relevant academic and experiential areas. See Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 637, 120 Stat. 637 (2006).
366
See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Admin Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933 (2008).
367
Whether congressional delegation of authority under the AWA was itself warranted is
subject to question. To date, delegation-based challenges to the Attorney General’s decision on the
retroactive application of the AWA, in particular, have failed. See, e.g., United States v. Samuels,
543 F. Supp. 2d 669 (E.D. Ky. 2008). However, it is arguable whether these outcomes, and the more
general desuetude of the non-delegation doctrine itself, are justified. Not only do the policy matters
in question have unique normative importance affecting the liberty of individual citizens, but they
also lack the technical complexity that typically justifies delegation based on agency expertise, not to
mention the need for insulation from undue political influence (such as with environmental
regulations). Moreover, unlike the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, promulgated by the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, federal guidelines issued since Wetterling have never been subject to even nominal
congressional oversight and approval, further undercutting political salience and accountability.
368
See supra notes 236–263 and accompanying text. With respect to federalism in particular,
the process betrayed ostensible executive sensitivity to federalism, as embodied in Executive Order
13,132 which discourages “one-size-fits-all approaches to public policy problems” and urges the
national government to be “deferential to the States when taking action that affects the policymaking
discretion of the States…” or when there are “uncertainties regarding constitutional or statutory
authority of the national government.” Exec. Order 13,132(2), 64 Fed. Reg. 43255 (1999).
369
For a detailed overview of this history see LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER, supra note 7,
ch. 3.
370
States, for instance, have succumbed to the temptation to proliferate registration eligibility
criteria beyond reason (e.g., posting an obscene bumper sticker in Alabama, or “Romeo and Juliet”
encounters between teens in several states) and imposed draconian community notification regimes
(e.g., requiring that registrants inform neighbors of their presence in the community in Louisiana).
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Wetterling Foundation (founded by his mother Patty), and the fifteenth state to
adopt a sex offender registration requirement (in 1991). From the outset, the bills
and amendments introduced by members were measured in tone and conscious of
the practical difficulties and possible negative constitutional implications of
registration.371 Concerns over constitutionality were publicly expressed by even
the state’s Republican Governor, Arne Carlson.372 In ensuing years, amid several
widely reported sexual victimizations of women and children, the state’s
registration law grew in scope and came to be complemented by community
notification, yet critical testimony and debate remained the political norm.373 The
outcome has been a provision decidedly less onerous than the AWA (including the
provision of extensive due process protections for registrants in its risk-based
classification regime). A similar measured course of events marked the origin and
evolution of New York’s registration and notification regime, which also numbers
among the nation’s most tempered.374
Needless to say, the political culture and legislative dynamic of states vary.
“Blue” states such as New York and Minnesota certainly cannot be said to qualify
as national benchmarks (or bellwethers). Nevertheless, the palpable differences in
the evolution of some state laws highlight the distinctiveness of the federal
legislative process relative to registration and notification. Whether, as Dan Filler
asserts, the federal process was significantly influenced by the presence of CSPAN’s national television audience, with “members of Congress seem[ing] to
play to the cameras,”375 or is perhaps explained by other structural factors,376 is
beside the point. The modus operandi of Congress over the twelve year period
(1994–2006) in which federal registration and community notification policy has
evolved shows a decided path-dependence, consistent with what William Stuntz
has termed its unique “pathology.”377 The trouble is, with the federal government
as the central planner, policy resulting from this pathology is imposed on the
nation as a whole, rather than being undertaken as an “experiment[] without risk to
371

See Wayne A. Logan, Jacob’s Legacy: Sex Offender Registration and Community
Notification Laws, Practice, and Procedure in Minnesota, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1287, 1292–93
(2003).
372
Id. at 1293.
373
Id. at 1296–1321.
374
See Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric,
76 IND. L.J. 315, 333–46 (2001).
375
See id. at 361.
376
In New York, for instance, the state’s legislative structure was more conducive to
concentrated critical consideration of bills because they came before legislators on single days, unlike
the more diffused approach of Congress which “took the form of speeches, rather than focused
debate, allowing easy avoidance of complex issues and questions.” Id. at 361–62.
377
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505
(2001).
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the rest of the country,” as Justice Brandeis suggested,378 and James Madison
envisioned.379
B. Floors, Ceilings, Uniform Laws?
Presuming, however, federal determination to intervene, a final question must
be addressed: Should the policy assume the form of a floor, prescribing only
minimum requirements for states; a hybrid floor-ceiling approach, containing both
minima and limits on what states can do; or a uniform set of requirements, which
states must adopt without variation or customization? The question has been
considered in other contexts, such as environmental regulation,380 with the federal
government historically inclined first to set “floors” based on worries over undue
state proclivity for laxness,381 and more recently “ceilings,” prompted by concerns
over states being too onerous.382 Because the federal government has customarily
refrained from imposing criminal justice policy on the states as a whole, however,
the issue remains an important and largely unexplored one warranting at least
preliminary attention here.
With floors, the federal government identifies a set of minimum requirements
that states must adopt, yet which states can augment. This of course has been the
federal modus operandi with registration and notification policy since the
Wetterling Act. While the minima themselves are problematic from a federalism
perspective, for reasons discussed earlier, the use of a floor enjoys some benefit.
Presuming that the federal floor itself constitutes sound policy (a big qualifier
here), use of a floor preserves for states some freedom to customize. As a result,
378

New State Ice Co. v. Leibmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
According to Madison, who of course wrote in a time when exercise of federal police
power was meager, federalism was created with the potentiality of mitigating such extremism among
states. Rather than nullifying such laws, the governing arrangement permitted them to be cabined in
their place of origin:
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States but will
be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States . . . . A rage for
paper money, for an abolition of debts . . . or for any other improper or wicked project,
will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union . . . therefore, we behold a
republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
380
See, e.g., William Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007).
381
See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67,
99–104 (1996) (discussing public choice reasons for why states will enact under-protective
environmental laws).
382
Buzbee, supra note 380, at 1568-76 (citing recent federal concern over efforts of certain
states to impose more stringent regulations than other states).
379
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interests of state autonomy, decentralization, and possible experimentation are
preserved to some degree.
These benefits, however, are qualified. With a floor, as discussed, the specter
of a “patchwork” of state laws exists, creating the risk that residents of states with
more stringent requirements will be comparatively better off. Moreover, creation
of a federal floor merely serves to facilitate the natural evolutionary accretion
noted above, with the pathological federal regime merely augmented by that of
individual states. State legislators, themselves in the C-SPAN audience,383 and
acutely aware of the political salience of toughened registration requirements, have
quite willingly embraced the opportunity, enacting provisions with impressive
speed. A floor thus obliges states to “level-up” to federal standards, and in the
current politically fertile atmosphere, affords a basis for the one-way ratchet so
common to criminal justice to operate,384 with provisions getting tougher by the
year, backed by overwhelming political support.385
What then of a floor-ceiling hybrid? On first impression, such an approach is
hard to envisage. Unlike ceilings in environmental regulations, now enjoying
increasing federal favor, where there is a tangible and often specific benchmark,
such as with pollution emission rates, registration and notification do not lend
themselves to maximum standards. However, the AWA does contain a discrete
provision that can be taken as a ceiling, assuming the form of mandatory
exclusions from public dissemination on state web site registries (e.g., registrants’
social security numbers).386 Although the myriad matters possibly pertaining to
registration and community notification make ceilings difficult, they would in
theory be possible. Congress could, if it wished, for instance, expressly bar
registration of juveniles altogether or adults convicted of non-physical sexual
misconduct (e.g., indecent exposure or possession of pornography). Such limits,
however, would have to be mandatory not optional, and coming as they would
from the federal policy-making environment described above, should be expected
383

Filler, supra note 374, at 324 n.60.
Ironically, just such a concern was voiced by Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE), a co-sponsor
of the AWA, who in floor debates condemned Aimee’s Law, enacted in 2000, which allowed a state
to recoup costs associated with the prosecution and punishment of an individual convicted of serious
crimes when such individual was previously convicted of a similar crime in another state, and the
latter state did not incarcerate the individual to the extent deemed appropriate by the federal
government. 42 U.S.C. § 13713 (2000). According to Senator Biden, the law would “promote a
‘race to the top,’ as states feel compelled to ratchet up their sentences—not necessarily because they
view such a shift as desirable public policy—but in order to avoid losing crucial federal law
enforcement funds.” 146 CONG. REC. 22106 (2000).
385
Here, one sees another telling contrast between environmental and criminal justice policy.
In the former, many states have enacted statutes that bar state regulators from imposing standards
more stringent than the applicable federal floor. See Jerome M. Organ, Limitation on State Agency
Authority to Adopt Environmental Standards More Stringent Than Federal Standards: Policy
Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1376–86 (1995).
386
See 42 U.S.C. § 16918(b)-(c) (2006).
384
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to be few in number. Also, under current political conditions the creation of a
federal ceiling will naturally serve to inspire states to satisfy that benchmark (e.g.,
imposing a duration cap on community notification), leading to possible suboptimal outcomes.
Finally, consideration must be afforded a uniform rule. Just as uniformity of
results is often regarded as preferable in the federal criminal justice system,
ensuring consistency of results nationwide,387 so too does it have advantages with
respect to state registration and notification policy, at least in theory.388 The
“patchwork” of laws concerning Congress would be eliminated: residents would
receive the same protections, and the systemic inefficiencies bred by varied state
laws, prompted especially when registrants change state residence (or live, work
and attend school in different jurisdictions), would be avoided. Indeed, registrants
themselves would be deprived of any incentive they might have to migrate in
search of a less onerous regime, leading to greater stability of the registrant subpopulation and fewer challenges for state authorities charged with updating and
verifying registrants’ information.
These potential benefits, however, must be balanced against the detriments of
uniformity. Uniformity has clear negative implications for the cluster of
federalism interests discussed earlier. With uniformity, as William Buzbee has
written, there is imposed on states a “final, unitary federal choice.”389 This
outcome becomes especially problematic when its constituent parts, the rules that
apply to the states, are predicated on incomplete or unfounded knowledge, and
result from an impaired process, as has been the case with registration and
notification.
These fundamental concerns, however, do not exhaust the pitfalls of
uniformity. With criminal justice, as with national environmental policy,390 efforts
to impose uniform rules risk creation of a mere false appearance of uniformity.
Substantive criminal laws and punishments,391 especially relative to sexual

387
Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in
Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. REV. 65 (2006).
388
On the perceived benefits of uniform state laws more generally, see Larry E. Ribstein &
Bruce Kobayashi, An Economic Analysis of Uniform State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 138–40
(1996).
389
Buzbee, supra note 380, at 1619.
390
See James E. Krier, On the Typology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal
System—and Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226, 1237 (1995) (noting that “the federal uniform
environmental quality standards have failed (and probably always will fail) to achieve uniform
environmental quality across all the states.”).
391
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 987 (1991) (noting the “enormous
variation” in state penalties); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 755 n.14 (1984) (“the classification
of state crimes differs widely among the States . . . .”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 168
(1952) (“crimes in the United States are what the laws of the individual States make them . . . .”).
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misconduct,392 show considerable variation among the states. A uniform rule only
serves to paper over this diversity.
The AWA’s centerpiece tier-based classification system, for instance, is
pegged to the normative punishment decisions of individual states, requiring that
tier classifications turn on whether convictions are “punishable by imprisonment
for more than 1 year.”393 An “individual convicted of a sex offense” that warrants
less than one year punishment under state law receives a tier I classification.394
Tiers II and III are reserved for state convictions punishable for more than one year
and involve offenses substantively “comparable to or more severe than” specified
federal offenses.395 Variations thus inevitably arise based on differences in state
criminal laws and punishments. The consequences of these differences are
significant, determining where an individual is placed within tiers I through III,
with the outcome driving (i) the duration of registration (and hence community
notification via the Internet), with tier I warranting 15 years, tier II 25 years, and
tier III life; (ii) the frequency of required in-person verification, with tier I
requiring annual, tier II semi-annual, and tier III quarterly; and (iii) whether the
registrant’s information can be exempted from public disclosure (reserved for tier
I, under certain circumstances).
Ultimately, the federal government should impose nationwide criminal justice
policy with great caution, if at all. Consistent with what David Super has called
the “leadership model” of fiscal federalism,396 the federal role can be, as it was in
earlier decades,397 and on occasion is still so today,398 engaged in a constructive
experimentalist partnership with states based on incentivizing “carrots” not
coercive “sticks.” Part of this relationship can be the development of model laws,
regarded as John Dewey would have it, “as working hypotheses, not as programs
to be rigidly adhered to and executed.”399 Indeed, such an approach was suggested
in the omnibus 1994 legislation containing the Wetterling Act, which entailed a
provision directing the attorney general to evaluate state juvenile handgun laws to
392
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA’S SEX
LAWS 2, 44–46 (1996) (surveying variations and referring to the laws as a “crazy quilt”).
393
42 U.S.C. § 16911(2)-(4) (2006).
394
Id. § 16911(2).
395
Id. § 16911(3)-(4).
396
David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2577 (2005).
397
See supra notes 14–47 and accompanying text.
398
See, e.g., Note, Cooking Up Solutions to a Cooked Up Menace: Responses to
Methamphetamine in a Federal System, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2508, 2516–19 (2006) (noting that with
respect to the effort to combat the methamphetamine problem, the United States has been deferential
to states and provided technical and fiscal support in the nature of incentives consistent with federal
will).
399
JOHN DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 202–03 (1927). Cf. United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (“the States may perform their role as laboratories for experimentation to
devise various solutions where the best solution is far from clear.”).
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develop model legislation, and to disseminate the study’s findings to the states.400
With a model law, a process can occur that is akin to the “efficient sorting” Larry
Ribstein and Bruce Kobayashi observed with civil laws drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).401
In sum, much as in decades before, when the federal government was far less
willing to dictate criminal justice policy to the states, individual states, attracted to
the approach advocated, can adopt and modify it as they see fit, and ideally through
an evolutionary process, superior policy results ultimately can be achieved. In this
way, the federal role can be like that of the American Law Institute in the creation
of the Model Penal Code. The Code, as Herbert Wechsler said, was created not to
“achieve uniformity in penal law throughout the nation,” but rather to serve as a
model to “stimulate and facilitate the systematic re-examination of the subject.”402
V. CONCLUSION
Federal concern over the perceived national menace of crime is of course not
new.
What is new, however, is the federal government’s resolve to impose a
national solution and the lack of any meaningful countervailing resistance to it.404
Just as the U.S. has increasingly moved to nationalize and render more uniform
heretofore disparate state approaches to commercial law, such as products liability,
and environmental policy, it has done so with criminal justice policy—in particular
that relating to sex offender registration and community notification. That the shift
403

400

See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 2012 (1994) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5653). The
AWA itself authorizes grants to states for the purposes of “establishing, enhancing, or operating”
involuntary civil commitment regimes for “sexually dangerous persons,” when such programs are
“consistent with guidelines issued by the Attorney General.” 42 U.S.C. § 16971 (2006). Why
Congress adopted this approach with involuntary commitments is unclear. However, the enormous
cost associated with maintaining commitment regimes, which itself has served as the major
impediment to its greater usage in states, doubtless played a role. See Janus & Logan, supra note
354. While Congress has been willing to impose on the states unfunded mandates to the degree
associated with registration and community notification, the consequences of civil commitment
appear to exceed that level of willingness.
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Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 388, at 133.
402
Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1427 (1968).
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See, e.g., RICHARD M. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN
VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM 3–36 (quoting Abraham Lincoln’s concern voiced in 1837 over the
“increasing disregard for law which pervades the country . . . .”).
404
Symptomatic of this shift, almost fifty years before the AWA codified federal authority to
prosecute emigrant sex offenders, Congress briefly entertained a very similar provision. In 1960,
Representative John A. Lafore, Jr. (R-PA) introduced a bill “[t]o provide that known sex offenders
who travel in interstate commerce shall register as prescribed by the Attorney General.” If an eligible
individual did not register within seven days of “entry into any federal district,” the individual faced a
$1,000 fine, a year in prison, or both. H.R. 11,652, 86th Cong. (1960) (introduced Apr. 7, 1960). The
bill died in committee while the AWA’s criminal provision won overwhelming endorsement.
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has occurred via federal use of the “Trojan horse”405 of conditional spending power
authority, rather than through the more controversial method of Commerce Clause
authority, does not alter the outcome. The nationalization of registration and
notification, systematically achieved by the federal government over a fifteen-year
period, has had major effect on constitutional federalism and the states themselves.
It may be that the unique social and political dynamic inspired by sex offenders is
unique,406 limiting the broader implications of the story chronicled here. However,
given the high political salience and potency of crime control more generally, and
the disdain felt for criminal offenders, this might well not be the case. If indeed
the essence of federalism lies, as William Livingston asserted over fifty years ago,
“not in the institutional or constitutional structure but in [the attitudes of] society
itself”407 then the transformation recounted here may well have broader
implications for other criminal justice policy areas in the years to come.
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See Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan
Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85.
406
This uniqueness is perhaps reflected in comparison to federal efforts to promote
determinate sentencing among states with the Truth-in-Sentencing law. See Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1370113709 (1994)). With the TIS, enacted as part of the same omnibus 1994 law containing the
Wetterling Act, Congress tied federal grants for prison construction to states enacting laws requiring
that their violent offenders serve at least eighty-five percent of the sentences imposed upon them. In
contrast to the sustained effort mounted with registration and notification, and despite the popularity
of a toughened stance on violent offenders, federal (and state) interest waned, and the program was
discontinued. See Susan Turner et al., An Evaluation of the Federal Government’s Violent Offender
Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants, 86 PRISON J. 364 (2006). Similarly,
“Aimee’s Law,” a 2000 law intended by Congress to ensure longer terms for offenders by requiring
that states in effect reimburse one another for costs associated with convicts that they prematurely
release and recidivate in another state, was never fully implemented. See supra note 212.
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William S. Livingston, A Note on the Nature of Federalism, 67 POL. SCI. QTLY. 81, 84
(1952). See also DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM (1987) (federalism “is a way of
thinking”).

